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1   Introduction     
Participation in armed conflict is and always has been closely connected to the masculine, and 
throughout history and across cultures combatants in the world’s many conflicts have 
overwhelmingly been male. However, in a number of conflicts, women are associated with 
fighting forces in a variety of roles and are thought to constitute between 10 per cent and one 
third of fighting forces (Bouta, Freks & Bannon 2005). In spite of this, up until the 1990s 
women’s different experiences in conflict had in general not been perceived as central in the 
debates of international relations and security studies (Kennedy-Pipe in Collins 2007:78 and 
Steans 2006:1). However, through UN Security Council’s Resolution 1325 on ´Women, 
Peace and Security` adopted in 2000, women’s security situation was put on the agenda, and 
an objective of gender mainstreaming was institutionalised into all UN operations and work. 
The resolution acknowledges women’s special needs during and after conflict, and it 
recognizes the importance of women’s participation and contribution in all phases of conflict 
resolution and peace building. It further recognises that women also participate in combat, 
and that female ex-combatants have different needs than their male colleagues in post-conflict 
environments, needs that shall be addressed when implementing strategies for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). In article 13 of the UN Resolution 1325, the 
Security Council: 
 
Encourages all those involved in planning for disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants 
and to take into account the needs of their dependants; (S/RES/1325 (2000)) 
 
DDR strategies include strategies to break up military structures, remove weapons from the 
hands of combatants, return them to their villages and homes, and to help them integrate 
socially and economically into society. The formal objective of the process is to contribute to 
security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can 
begin. 
 
In the devastating and long-lasting Liberian civil war, which ended in 2003, women 
participated in every stage of the conflict, as combatants, supporters, wives, cooks, peace 
builders, and political actors. Numbers differ, but according to some estimates women 
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comprised between 30 and 40 per cent of the total number of Liberian combatants. (Amnesty 
International 2008:5). The official Liberian DDR policies were progressive and quested for a 
gender-mainstreamed programme through references to UNSC Resolution 1325, article 13. 
Accordingly, in UNIFEM’s extensive report on gender and DDR from 2004, “Getting it 
Right, Doing it Right”, Liberia is used as an example of progress when it comes to policy 
commitments to gender mainstreaming. Yet, despite an intention to ensure women’s 
participation and address their special needs, the literature and reports on the subject is 
unanimous in concluding that this was not adequately translated into action on the ground. 
Liberian female fighters did not take part in the DDR process in proportion to their 
participation in the actual fighting, and the participation rate was significantly lower then for 
the male ex-combatants. The dropout rates from the DDR program were also higher amongst 
the female ex-combatants, and the programme in many areas failed to address the different 
needs of women and girls (Amnesty International 2008, Jennings 2009a, Mazurana 2005 and 
2004, Specht 2006, Specht and Attree 2006). As UNIFEM (2004:9) puts it: “Getting it right” 
does not automatically translate into “doing it right”. The challenges and obstacles to 
translating the policies into action can be numerous, and on this background the research 
question is specified to:  
 
What can explain the gap between the prescriptions of gender mainstreaming in the official 
DDR-policies and the action on the ground in Liberia? 
 
 
My intent with this thesis is to analyse why one did not manage to adequately implement the 
prescribed policies of gender mainstreaming in the DDR program in Liberia, using two 
different theoretical approaches. Through the theoretical approaches general challenges of 
implementing policies through the UN peacekeeping system will be identified, but also 
specific obstacles connected to implementing the policy of gender mainstreaming. In the 
following I will clarify the relevance and reasons for the choice of topic and case, briefly 
outline the theoretical approaches (which will be more thoroughly done in chapter 2), and 
specify the research design and its implications. First, there is a need to make some 
clarifications and operationalisations. 
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1.1 Operationalisation and clarifications 
In order to answer the specified research question, certain operationalisations and 
clarifications must be made. First of all, the concept “gender mainstreaming” was first 
proposed at the 1985 Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, and has later been 
developed in the United Nations development community. There are different definitions of 
the concept, but the one most commonly used defines “gender mainstreaming” as:  
 
the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned 
action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all 
levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and 
experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal 
spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. 
The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality (ECOSOC 1997).  
 
Through ECOSOC’s adoption, in 1998, of a resolution (1998/43) on mainstreaming a gender 
perspective into the policies and programmes of the United Nations system, the goal of 
gender equality became central in all activities. The adoption of UNSC Resolution 1325 was a 
continuation of this development, emphasising the need to also include and address the needs 
of women in all areas related to peace and security. Article 13 of the resolutions thus 
constitutes the specified prescription of gender mainstreaming of DDR processes. 
 
The foundation for the Liberian DDR process was the Comprehensive Peace Accords (CPA) 
signed by the warring parties to the conflict in 2003. It requested the launching of the DDR 
programme and a deployment of an international peacekeeping force to take responsibility in 
the implementation of the programme. The CPA did not contain any specific policies on 
gender mainstreaming the DDR process, but the UN Security Council Resolution 1509, which 
appointed and mandated the UN Mission to Liberia (UNMIL), has prescriptions on the DDR 
process and handling of female ex-combatants that builds on UNSC resolution 1325, article 
13. The “official DDR-policies” referred to in my research question is thus UNSC resolution 
1325, article 13, applied to the Liberian context through UNSC resolution 1509, article 3(f). 
When discussing the implementation, references will for simplicity be made mainly to 
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resolution 1325, article 13. On the background of the ´official DDR policies` referred to being 
a UN resolution and the mandate of UNMIL, but also because they had the main 
responsibility in the implementation process, my focus will be on the role of the UN mission 
to Liberia. National actors, however, also took part in the complex process, and joint units of 
both international and national actors were created to have different responsibilities during the 
process (cf. 3.5). When talking of the “DDR authorities” I thus refer to the broad network of 
actors in the process, under the authority of UNMIL.  
 
My dependent variable is how well one managed to implement the prescribed policies of 
resolution 1325, article 13, in Liberia during the official DDR programme. The research 
question builds on an assumption that this implementation was weak and resulted in a gap 
between the prescribed policies and the action on the ground. “Action on the ground” is 
understood as the content of the official, context-specific, DDR programs and the actual 
execution of these. This assumption is supported by a range of researchers (see Amnesty 
International 2008, Jennings 2009a, Mazurana 2005 and 2004, Specht 2006, Specht and 
Attree 2006), and in chapter 4 the performance on the dependent variable will be more closely 
discussed and outlined, focusing on the compliance between the stated goals of the policies 
and the local measures. 
1.2 Why does it matter? 
Does it really matter whether women did go through the DDRR or not?  
Former UNDP Officer (2010 [interview]) 
 
Different arguments are used to justify the importance of including women in resolution of 
conflicts and in peace-building, but two main approaches can be identified; the instrumentalist 
and the normative. These approaches overlap in some areas, but have somewhat different 
aims, priorities and threshold for success. The instrumentalist approach is an apolitical, 
pragmatic approach where gender is seen as just another tool in the toolbox for achieving an 
overarching goal one has set, for instance ´national security`. It is typically less concerned 
with attitudinal change than behavioural change in society and institutions, it is less about 
progressive transformation of gender roles than the pragmatic accommodation of specific 
groups (Jennings 2009b:2). The normative approach to gendering programmes builds on but 
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goes further than the instrumentalist approach. From this perspective the improvement of 
women’s well-being and fulfilment of their human rights has a value in it self, and the 
approach advocates a more thorough change in gender roles. Gender equality and attention to 
gender issues are seen as ends in themselves, not means to an end (Jennings 2009b:3).  
 
Based in the instrumentalist approach successful inclusion of female ex-combatants in the 
DDR programme is important because it is necessary to reach the overarching goal of the 
process. According to UNIFEM (2004:9) the need to integrate gender perspectives to 
precipitate the degree of social change and transformation required to demilitarize a violent 
society is increasingly being recognised. Based in the fact that such a high percentage of the 
combatants in the Liberian civil war were women, the importance of including them 
successfully in the DDR program to ameliorate the security and stability in post-conflict 
Liberia should be obvious. On the other hand, the normative approach would regard the 
inclusion of female ex-combatants in the programme as vital because gender equality has a 
value in itself. Considering that women and girls were an integral part of the fighting forces, 
as combatants, workers, wives and supporters, a failure in DDR to reach them should 
consequently be taken seriously (Specht 2006:17). The unequal treatment of female fighters 
doesn’t only deprive them of the benefits given to male soldiers, but it has a signal effect to 
the broader society, and reinforces the traditional gender stereotypes (Jennings 2009a:489).  
 
Regardless of whether the overarching goal is gender equality or if one “simply” wants to 
build peace in the most efficient way, it really matters whether women are included in the 
DDR strategies or not. Both from the instrumentalist and normative approach implementing 
resolution 1325 article 13 is vital, either as a means to an end or an end in itself. Analysing 
why the strategies targeting the female ex-combatants did not work in an optimal manner is 
thus highly relevant.  
1.3 Why Liberia?  
Often being depicted as a “poster child” when it comes to gender issues, and with the first 
female president of Africa, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,1 Liberia was chosen as a case from the 
                                                
1 Ellen Johnson Sierleaf was elected president in 2005, making Liberia the first African nation with a female 
president 
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universe of DDR processes with gender mainstreaming included in their mandates, on the 
basis of its particular relevance and appropriateness. During the civil war, the country had a 
relatively high percentage of female participation, making it of higher substantial significance 
analysing the shortcomings of the process here. Moreover, UNMIL, who was formally 
responsible for the DDR process, was one of the first UN peacekeeping missions with a 
Gender Office (The Office of the Gender Advisor, OGA), and the country had an unusual 
level of collective female activism advocating for peace, and later for female inclusion in the 
DDR (Anderlini 2000:19-20, Fuest 2008:11, Puechguirbal 2004:53-54). These factors 
immediately seem to facilitate a successful implementation of UNSC resolution 1325, but 
seeing that there were still severe shortcomings in the implementation makes it particularly 
interesting to analyse the underlying causes for this.  
1.4 Theoretical Approach 
The gender perspective has to a large degree been missing in theoretical DDR research. The 
few contributions that exists are mainly grounded in a ´feminist-security` paradigm, in which 
traditional perceptions of security and gender roles is viewed as the main constraint to the 
inclusion of women (see for instance Barth 2002, Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008, and Specht 
2006). Accordingly, Jennings (2009a) presents the so-called “securitization-hypothesis” about 
the DDR process in Liberia, which states that the female fighters were disregarded because 
the DDR in Liberia was driven and justified by a security imperative. This will be my starting 
point in the analysis. I argue, however, that this alleged prioritization of security is only a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the unsuccessful implementation of UNSC 
resolution 1325, article 13, in Liberia.2 This is based on an assumption that there is no 
inherent contradiction in the process being security driven and justified, and implementing 
resolution 1325 successfully. My findings also indicated that there were other relevant 
structural and institutional explanatory variables that need to be included in the explanation in 
addition to the security argument. To shed light on this I will take a different approach then 
the already existing literature and make use of the analytical framework of implementation 
theory, as the political phenomenon under scrutiny is an implementation of a policy. 
                                                
2 The concepts necessary and sufficient refer to the implicational relationships between statements. A condition 
can be either necessary or sufficient without being the other. A necessary condition of a statement must be 
satisfied for the statement to be true. A sufficient condition is one that, if satisfied, assures the statement's truth.  
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Implementation theory utilizes a range of structural and practical independent variables to 
explain why public policies often do not have the intended results, and the goals set at the 
outset rarely are fulfilled in practice.  
 
The advantage of using implementation theory is that the analytical framework is very clear 
and precise, and though it is originally used to study the implementation of public policies at 
the national level it can provide insights also on implementation of policies on the 
international level. Though this exact theoretical approach has not (to my knowledge) been 
used to analyse gender mainstreaming of international policies, using insights from the field 
of ´public policy and administration` to shed light on issues in international politics is not a 
novel undertaking. I thus contend that the same variables identified as essential in the 
implementation of national policies, are also relevant when it comes to assessing the 
implementation of UN policies in peacekeeping operations. The clarity of the analytical 
model moreover facilitates the transfer from the national to the international level, which will 
be elaborated on in the theory chapter in the presentation of each of the relevant variables in 
the model.  
1.5 Peacekeeping and DDR programmes 
The number of United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world, and the breadth of 
their tasks, is unprecedented in the 21st century. Enormous resources are spent on stabilising 
fragile states, and activities ensuring security are promoted and developed (Muggah 2009:1). 
UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations 
Security Council, which sets out the tasks that the peacekeeping mission are required to 
perform. The mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the 
conflict and the specific challenges it presents (UN 2008:16), but amongst the many activities 
undertaken in post-conflict societies are the DDR programmes. They are now considered 
complex but crucial parts of all peace building processes (Muggah 2009:1).  More then 60 
DDR processes have taken place around the world since the early 1990s, and over a million 
ex-combatants have participated. It is widely considered a growth industry, as the programs 
are getting broader and more long-term, in addition to an expanding caseload of beneficiaries. 
A wide range of both UN agencies and NGOs are usually a part of the DDR process, and they 
are frequently viewed as the major means of improving security after violent conflict 
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(Muggah 2010:3). The disarmament and demobilisation phase are the most immediate ones, 
often implemented in connection with peace agreements. They are defined by the UN (2005) 
respectively as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the 
civilian population, and furthermore the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants 
from armed forces or other armed groups. The reintegration phase is a more long-term 
process, defined by the UN (2005) as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian 
status and gain sustainable employment and income.3 
 
The peacekeeping paradigm, and with it the DDR programmes, have in the last years 
experienced a shift from a limited and minimalist focus on maintaining stability between the 
parties to a conflict, to a more multidimensional and maximalist mandate of both military and 
civilian character (Muggah 2009:3). The security-first approach has shifted into a combined 
security- and development approach, as UN operations today are expected to both protect and 
empower the society through their interventions. Their mandates now usually consist of social 
welfare objectives in addition to the traditional military, policing and rule of law tasks in a 
peacekeeping operation (Muggah 2010:1-2).  
1.5.1 The DDR beneficiaries 
The main beneficiaries to DDR programmes have typically been “combatants”, understood in 
a narrow and traditional way as armed men. This definition has left the women and girls who 
have been part of armed groups on the sideline, less likely to be identified as beneficiaries to 
DDR processes because the majority of them have occupied non-fighting roles and do not 
possess weapons. Regardless of what role they actually played in the group, fighting or non-
fighting, women are in this context usually classified as a “vulnerable group associated with 
armed movements”, signifying participation in armed groups in supportive roles (Amnesty 
International 2008:5, UNIFEM 2004:4).  
 
                                                
3 In the Liberian case one also operated with a “Rehabilitation” component. This component was, however, not 
clarified, and it’s specific purpose and expected outcomes remained blurred throughout the process. The only 
tangible indication of rehabilitation appears to be the provision of a short session with a psychological 
counsellor during demobilization (Pugel 2009:73). I will therefore in the following denote the programme as a 
DDR programme, and accordingly analyse only these 3 phases. 
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One of the developments seen in DDR policies the last years is that the admission criteria are 
broadened to include a larger group of beneficiaries to the programme. According to the 
UNDDR (2006) all those who are found to be members of an armed force or group, whether 
they were involved in active combat or in support roles (such as cooks, porters, messengers, 
administrators, sex slaves and ‘war wives’), shall be considered part of the armed force or 
group and therefore shall be included in the DDR programme. This substantially broadens the 
understanding of the term “combatant” in the context of DDR programmes, no longer solely 
denoting an individual carrying a gun but all members of armed groups, also the ones in non-
fighting roles.  
 
As we shall see, having participated in the fighting or been part of a fighting force was also 
formally the criterion for eligibility to the programme in Liberia (UNDDR 2006). IN practice, 
however, the label ex-combatant was still mainly preserved for men. All the women  oing 
through the program were labelled “women associated with the fighting forces” (WAFFs) in 
the official statistics, even though a number of them had in fact been soldiers. 
 
On the background of a somewhat inconsistent terminology, used differently in theory in 
practice, I have chosen to define “ex-combatants” according to the formal eligibility criteria 
set by the UNDDR (2006) above. “Female ex-combatants” is thus women who have been part 
of a fighting force, for a shorter or longer period, in a fighting or non-fighting role. 
Consequently, when speaking of WAFFs in the following, it denotes exclusively the women 
who have been part of a fighting force, for a shorter or longer period, in a non-fighting role. 
1.6 Research Design 
Studying the challenges in implementing UN resolution 1325, article 13 in Liberia has 
required a qualitative study. The qualitative approach has its clear advantages in fields that are 
theoretically underdeveloped and where the concepts are still vague (Ragin and Meur 
2000:750). The body of literature concerning gender perspectives in DDR processes and 
peace operations is limited, and few attempts at developing theoretical frameworks exist. My 
approach in this thesis is partly theory testing and partly exploring. Most qualitative 
researchers utilize an inductive approach, in which theory is seen as something that emerges 
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from the collection and analysis of data. However, it is also argued that qualitative data can 
play an important role in testing theories (Bryman 2004:270).  
 
The study is designed through a case study of the DDR process in Liberia, a design that is 
commonly defined as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context (Yin 2003:13). It is an advantageous design when a set of events, 
over which the investigator has little control, are examined, thus seeming appropriate when 
studying the Liberian DDR process. Conducting a case study moreover enables a thorough 
examination of the chosen case and the operation of causal mechanisms through looking at 
large numbers of contextual and intervening variables (George & Bennett 2005:21, Yin 
2003:9).  
 
One of the strengths of the case study is the opportunity to use many different sources of 
evidence (Yin 2003:97). My primary data collection method is one of the main research 
methods associated with qualitative research, namely qualitative interviews. This is based in 
an interpretivist epistemological position, in which one seeks to understand the social world 
through the interpretations of it by its participants (Bryman 2004:267-268). A field study with 
semi-structured interviews of key-actors has been conducted to obtain the required 
information. Also secondary sources has been used, including the DDR Strategic and 
Implementation Framework (2003), UNIFEM´s (2004) report on Gender and DDR, an UNDP 
evaluation of the DDR process (2006), Pugel´s (2007) survey of ex-combatants in Liberia, 
and the reports by Amnesty International´s (2008) and Specht (2006) on the experiences of 
women and girl ex-combatants in Liberia. In addition I have drawn on previous research on 
DDR processes, peacekeeping operations, and gender mainstreaming.  
1.6.1 Validity and reliability 
The intent of social science is to say something about causal relationships existing in the “real 
world”. This study takes a constructionist ontological position, acknowledging that social 
phenomena are outcomes of the interactions between individuals and exists as ideas and 
experiences, rather than phenomena ´out there` existing separate from those involved in its 
construction (Bryman 2004:266). Through the qualitative interviews, the study draws on the 
interpretations of key actors to say something about the social phenomena in question. 
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Providing valid and reliable explanations for causal relationships, concerning whether one 
event can be explained by another, requires that a number of research methodological 
principles are satisfied. I will start with assessing the validity of my research, which refers to 
the relevance of data in terms of how well they answer the research question. There are three 
specific types of criteria; internal validity, referring to the credibility of the causal 
conclusions, external validity, concerning to what degree it is possible to generalise from the 
findings, and construct validity, looking at how well the study measures what the researcher 
intended (Yin 2003:34). 
 
Even though high internal validity is one of the strengths of qualitative methods there are 
some issues that can constitute a challenge. In case studies, especially problems of relevant 
third variables can threaten the validity of the causal conclusions (Yin 2003:36). It is in a non-
experimental design impossible to isolate and control the different explanatory variables, 
making it impossible to exclude that other variables then the ones identified in the analysis 
can be relevant. However, using open-ended or semi structured interviews, interviews where 
the questioning takes the form of a conversation, and the questions and responses are less 
standardized, heightens the internal validity. It is through this method easier to discover 
variables and causal relationships one did not know on forehand as the interview object can 
point to variables the scientist might not have thought of (Aberbach & Rockman 2002, Berry 
2002). In my interviews I had the opportunity to probe the issues of interest by adjusting the 
questions as I went along, asking follow-up questions and asking for explanations when 
things were not clear. This provided a broad basis of data, and made it easier to identify new 
relevant independent variables. Assessing the credibility of the causal conclusions, one also 
has to be aware of the possibility of biased responses from the informants, caused by different 
types of interview effects. Biases in the interview data also affects the reliability of a study, 
and my considerations on potential biases in my material will be evaluated closer in the 
section concerning reliability. 
 
In case study research there is a tension between achieving high internal validity and good 
historical explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to 
broader populations (George & Bennett 2005:22). External validity is seen as one of the 
weaknesses of case studies as one should not, and cannot, aspire to make claims that the 
12 
 
findings from one case are applicable and directly representative of a larger population 
(George & Bennett 2005:32). Yin (2003:37-38) nevertheless maintains that though not 
particularly suitable for statistical generalization, analytical generalizations can be done on the 
basis of case studies, in which the researcher strives to generalize a particular set of results to 
a broader theory. This signifies that although the results from my case study cannot be 
directly generalized to a larger universe or automatically valid in other cases, some of the 
mechanisms at play in the case of Liberia may be relevant in other cases as they are 
generalized to an “extended” implementation theory, including the securitization argument. 
Through replicating my findings in other cases where the theory indicates that the same 
results should occur can strengthen the validity of using implementation theory also on the 
international level on UN resolutions, and extending it with the security component, and thus 
be the new domain to which results could be generalized. 
 
Construct validity is about making the concepts one wishes to examine measurable. The 
concepts under scrutiny in the social sciences are often complex and multifaceted, but the 
researcher must seek to operationalise them in a way that captures the full content of the 
concept, making it possible to measure and register the concept in a satisfying and reliable 
manner (Skog 2004:89-90). If not, there is a possibility that one measures something else then 
what one is actually after, and the basis for making causal assumptions accordingly becomes 
weak. This has been a challenge in my study, as a number of the relevant concepts have 
unclear definitions and can certainly be very difficult to measure adequately. Both my 
dependent and independent variables demands thorough operationalisation. In accordance 
with Yin’s (2003:36) recommendations I have thus attempted to counteract low construct 
validity by drawing on multiple sources when constructing a set of measures against which to 
evaluate the dependent and the various independent variables (cf. chapter 2).  
 
The last methodological criterion is that of reliability, which concerns to what extent a study 
can be replicated. It is about the accuracy with which the data has been collected. The key 
question is: would we get the same results if the research had been carried out at a different 
point in time or by another researcher? This is a difficult criterion to meet in qualitative 
research, as it is impossible to “freeze” social settings and circumstances of an initial study to 
make it replicable (Bryman 2004:273), but the goal must be to minimize the errors and biases 
of the study (Yin 2003:37). As mentioned, the use of semi-structured interviews can be of 
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advantage when it comes to heightening the internal validity, however, the valuable flexibility 
of semi-structured interviews aggravate the reliability of the research because of difficulties 
coding and interpreting the information from these types of interviews. Subsequently, semi-
structured interviews can be effected by so-called “interview effects”, which implies that the 
interviewer or the situation in itself brings about different answers from the person being 
interviewed than would normally come about. Keeping this in mind, when reviewing my 
interview data I have been aware of the possibility of systematic bias. I have especially been 
attentive when analysing the interviews done with the female fighters, which were of a 
sensitive character. Moreover, one of the conducted interviews done with the female fighters 
was a group interview, in addition to three other group interviews. Evaluating the data from 
these interviews I have been aware that group dynamics and the size of the group can affect 
the answers (Frey and Fontana 1991:185). In the interviews with UNMIL and UNDP actors, 
who were responsible for the DDR process, attention were paid to the possibility of the 
respondents portraying the gender mainstreaming as more successful then it in reality was. A 
way of heightening the reliability is to compare different sources describing the same event, 
through data triangulation. In addition to my own interview data I have therefore utilized 
relevant secondary literature, as well as public sources like UN reports and surveys to 
heighten the reliability level. This way it should be possible to discover contradictions, and 
avoid inconsistent results. Using and analysing multiple sources of evidence strengthens the 
validity and reliability of the research since it provides the research with multiple measures of 
the same phenomenon (Yin 2003:99). But drawing on the work of others, one also have to 
assess the validity and reliability of the sources, and keep in mind the context in which they 
came about. When assessing my secondary sources, I find no reason to doubt neither their 
validity nor reliability, as they are all conducted by serious actors, apparently in accordance 
with prevailing research ethics. 
 
The possibility for replicating a study depends on documentation of the procedures, methods, 
considerations and steps taken throughout the research process. To heighten the reliability of 
my study I have thus carefully kept both recordings of interviews, transcriptions and notes 
from the interviews. In addition to the already discussed research design and data collecting 
method, the next paragraphs will furthermore examine the different steps of the fieldwork, 
challenges faced and considerations taken, further contributing to a heightening of the 
reliability of my study. 
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1.7 Conducting fieldwork 
My field study was conducted in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, lasting for four weeks in 
February/March 2010. I conducted 28 interviews with 38 informants, through 24 individual 
interviews and 4 group interviews.4 The informants can be grouped in two main categories; 
´the DDR policymakers` on the one side, constituting of representatives from the UNMIL, 
UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM, the National Commission on the DDR (NCDDR) and the 
Ministry of Gender and Development, and the ´DDR beneficiaries` on the other, which 
constituted of female ex-combatants. In addition three representatives from national women’s 
organisations, the WIPNET and WONGOSOL, were interviewed. The reason why the 
fieldwork was performed in Monrovia is primarily that the UNMIL headquarter is situated 
there, and the different UN agencies and NGOs all have their main offices in the capital. The 
interviews with female ex-combatants were conducted in Salala, Bong County, and in New 
Kru Town, one of the shantytowns at the outskirts of Monrovia.  
1.7.1 Acquiring the informants 
The main problem I faced when acquiring the informants was the fact that the official DDRR 
programme in Liberia ended in 2009, and the DD-components as early as in 2004, so many of 
the UN officials and international NGO staff that worked with the DDR process were simply 
no longer in the country. This was reflected in some of the interviews I got with 
representatives for the ´DDR policymakers`, where the respondents had not worked directly 
with the DDR process, or had worked with it from another professional position then they 
occupied now. Likewise, getting in touch with representatives from the NCDDR turned out to 
be difficult, as the commission ceased to exist in 2008, and the people who worked there now 
have other occupations. The time-gap also made it difficult when trying to get in touch with 
female ex-combatants to interview. By now, many of them have gone back to their 
communities, and are no longer identified as ex-combatants. Several of my respondents 
pointed out that the label ´ex-combatant` was not used anymore, and the number of projects 
targeting this group has decreased markedly, for the benefit of a broader reintegration 
                                                
4 The 4 groups interviews comprised of an interview with 7 women from a Red Cross reintegration program, an 
interview of 3 psychosocial counsellors from the Landmine Action Program, 2 DDR officers from the UNMIL 
RRR-section and lastly, 2 WIPNET officers. For more details, see the appendix with a list of interviews. 
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approach where “vulnerable groups” in general are targeted.  However, there are still some 
projects that mainly or partly target ex-combatants, and the selection of female fighters that I 
interviewed, were drawn from groups of participants in two different reintegration and skills 
training programmes. These were both run by NGOs, respectively the Landmine Action; a 
UK-based NGO, and the Liberian National Red Cross Society.  
 
Landmine Action, in collaboration with the Liberian Ministry of Agriculture, run the Tumutu 
Agricultural Training Programme situated in central Liberia in Salala, Bong County. The 
programme provides practical and technical agricultural training, to 400 ex-combatants and 
war-affected youth. Of the 400 beneficiaries currently enrolled in the programme, 44 are 
women, of which I interviewed 12. The Liberian National Red Cross Society runs a “Liberia 
Economic Empowerment of Adolescent Girls and Young Women Project”, in two different 
areas in Monrovia, namely New Kru Town and Clara town. The program targets ”vulnerable 
women” of different categories: there are street girls, sex-slaves, single mothers, illiterate 
women and female ex-combatants. Of the 100 participating women, roughly 8 of them are ex-
combatants. I conducted a group interview with 7 of these women on a home visit in Central 
New Kru Town.  
1.7.2 Interviews 
The purpose of my interviews was in the case of the female ex-fighters to get information on 
their experiences in the war and with the DDR process, whether or not they participated in the 
programme (in one or more of the phases), the reasons for non-participation (or participation), 
and experiences in the program. The groups of female ex-combatants were not drawn in such 
a manner as to be representative of a bigger universe of female ex-combatants, as they were 
both from a limited geographical area and in a “special” situation, being part of ongoing 
reintegration programmes. An official at the Ministry for Gender and Development for 
instance underlined that the women participating in the Landmine Action programme were 
not representative, since they all had the possibility to leave their family and children for a 
period of 3 months to take part in the programme. Furthermore, none of the women at the 
Landmine Action programme had participated in the official DDR programme. Drawing on 
the information from these interviews I have thus taken this into consideration, and utilized 
them in an illustrative and supportive manner, rather then drawing conclusions based on them. 
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The purpose of interviewing the DDR authorities and women’s groups was both getting 
factual information on the organizing, designing and implementation process, but also the 
informants personal views on the (lack of) success of the process and the underlying reasons 
for the performance. The DDR policymakers and representatives from the women’s 
organisations were key-actor informants and hence not drawn to be a representative sample. 
As mentioned, all the interviews were semi-structured, based on a general interview guide, 
but at the same time open for changes and adjustment, follow-ups and additional questions.  
1.7.3 Language 
The official language in Liberia is English, so in the majority of the interviews there was no 
need for an interpreter. However, the Liberian English can be difficult to comprehend, 
especially spoken by people in the hinterland, but also amongst the people in the areas outside 
Monrovia. Therefore all interviews with the female ex-combatants were conducted with an 
interpreter. The interpreter was in both cases psychosocial counsellors working in the 
programmes in which the women were beneficiaries. Having a translator present can affect 
the interview situation and the validity and reliability of the data obtained in different ways. 
The apparent advantage of having a translator present when speaking to these women, that 
less information get lost or misinterpreted, thus had to be weighed up against the fact that 
having the counsellors present whilst conducting the interviews might have influenced the 
extent to which the women could speak freely. When it came to the personal opinions they 
gave me about the programmes they were currently a part of, I see as likely that they were 
restrictive in criticising them in front of staff member. However, when it came to the 
information that was most relevant for me; their experiences during the war, their 
participation in armed forces, and their experiences with the DDRR process, having the 
counsellors present seemed to make the respondents talk more openly about sensitive issues 
as the women had already gone through extensive counselling with the psychosocial 
counsellors in the programs, and seemed to be more willing to share their stories with me 
when assured by the counsellors that they could trust me. 
1.7.4 Tape recorder and notes 
In qualitative research, interviews with informants are often recorded. Recording interviews 
has the advantage that it corrects the natural limitation of our memories by allowing us to go 
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back and repeatedly examine the exact words of the respondent. In that way, it allows more 
thorough examination of what the respondent say, and counteracts the tendency we have to 
place glosses on what people say in interviews (Bryman 2004:330). It furthermore opens up 
the collected data to public scrutiny, and can counter possible accusations of bias from the 
researcher. However, using recording equipment may also come with a cost in terms of 
“disturbing” the interview by putting of the interviewees, making them more self-conscious or 
maybe alarmed at the prospect of their words being preserved (ibid.).  
 
I conducted the majority of my interviews without a tape recorder; only 3 interviews were 
conducted with a recorder. In the RRR-unit in UNMIL I was not allowed to use the recorder 
because of restrictions from the employer. The choice not to utilise a tape recorder during the 
other interviews was based mainly on personal preferences and style, but also an assessment 
of the settings in which the interviews took place. When interviewing the female ex-
combatants I considered the situation and the sensitivity of the topic to be of such a manner 
that using a tape recorder could limit their responses extensively. The interviews with the 
women took place respectively at the campus site of the Landmine Action project, and during 
a home visit in New Kru Town, and I assessed that using a tape recorder in these settings 
would be counter productive. The interviews with especially the national actors, WIPNET, 
WONGOSOL and NCDDRR, all had an informal character, accordingly my assessments 
were the same. 
 
The problem with not recording the interview is of course that the information is less 
accurate. I could not through my notes from the interviews capture exactly how the 
respondents expressed themselves, their choice of words and their intonation. This problem 
was considered during the field study, and attempted counteracted by taking thorough and 
detailed notes during the interviews as well as complementing the notes immediately after the 
interviews were terminated, based on my recollections of the responses. When it comes to the 
recorded interviews on the other hand, de-contextualisation is a challenge one has to be aware 
of. I therefore tried to write down a contextualisation of all the interviews, shortly after I had 
conducted them: where and how long the interview lasted, the setting, my first impression of 
the informant and the responses that was given, and the credibility of the main findings.  
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Since my analytical approach to the gathered data does not demand detailed attention to 
language, such as conversation or discourse analysis would have, I do not think my analysis 
suffered substantially from the lack of recorded interviews. Furthermore, transcribing 
recorded interviews is both time consuming and it generates vast amounts of paper, which 
needs to be gone through when analysing (Bryman 2004:331-332). In light of the limited time 
I had to realize the research project, and the number of interviews conducted, this was also a 
factor when choosing to carry out most of the interviews without a tape recorder. 
Nevertheless, in the retrospective I recognise that my analysis could have gained somewhat 
from the use of tape recorder during the more formal interviews with the UN agencies, in 
terms of getting more detailed records of the interviews. 
1.8 Research ethics 
Throughout the research process, making ethical considerations have been of importance. In 
regards to the informants and the interview situation, getting the information needed has to be 
combined with being aware when asking sensitive questions. Especially in the interviews with 
the female ex-combatants, I anticipated that some of the topics touched upon could be painful 
for the respondents to talk about. For the purpose of the research it was not necessary for me 
to probe into the difficult issues. However, I attempted to make the interview setting more 
assuring by always having a psychosocial counsellor from the training programs present, 
which the women had already done extensive trauma counselling with. Moreover I assured 
them that their identities would not be revealed.  Informing the respondents of the purpose of 
the interviews and the nature of the research (Wolvier 2002:677), in addition to getting their 
consent to use the information from the interviews is important. In regard to revealing the 
identity of the persons interviewed, the question of consent had to be considered, but also the 
principle of confidentiality, and whether it could have any consequences for the informants to 
be identified. Recognizing that the reliability of the study can deteriorate when the informants 
are not identified, but emphasizing the principle of ´do no harm` (Wolvier 2002:677), the 
female ex-combatants, and some of the other respondents are anonymous, while the others are 
presented by name. 
 
Doing my fieldwork I also had to consider my role as a European, female student, and how 
the informants would react to me conducting research. First of all, considering the topic of my 
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research, I see as likely that my sex made it easier for me to get information from the female 
ex-combatants. They were all willing to talk to me, even though my intent with the interviews 
seemed somewhat difficult to understand for many of the women. It also turned out that the 
different officials in general were positive to speak to me, though a few expressed that they 
found my topic of research somewhat irrelevant, whilst others expressed a fatigue of being 
questioned about ´gender issues`. However, people wanted to be part of the project, and 
seemed to talk openly about their experiences.   
1.9 Outline 
In the following chapter the theoretical framework for my analysis will be outlined, firstly 
Jennings´ “securitization-hypothesis”, and secondly, the implementation theory. A so-called 
top-down approach to implementation studies are chosen, and through a causal model six 
independent variables are introduced that can be relevant for the “performance” in the 
implementation process. Chapter 3 provides a brief historical overview of the civil war, and 
more thoroughly examines the role of women in the war. The underlying reasons for their 
participation and the different roles they occupied in the armed groups will be discussed, in 
light of prevailing gender roles in Liberia before and now. Lastly, the importance of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in gender mainstreaming will be commented on, and the 
DDR programme outlined in more detailed. This chapter is meant to contextualize the 
theoretical approach and provide the background knowledge necessary to follow the 
discussion. Chapter 4 is a discussion on the dependent variable. Based on my primary data, 
and with support in secondary sources and previous research, I conduct a detailed review of 
the theoretical and practical inclusion of female fighters in the process, and the actual 
measures taken to target their different needs, compared to the ones outlined in the policy 
prescriptions. Finally, in chapter 5, the two complementary explanatory models are used to 
analyse my data. I will discuss to what extent my findings support the “securitization-
hypothesis”, and complement with an analyses of my findings through the analytical 
framework of implementation theory. 
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2 Theoretical approach      
There is a rich body of literature on armed conflict and gender, though in most of it women 
are still perceived as inherently peace loving or as passive victims, placed in the role of rape 
victims, abandoned mothers, or mourning widows (Malkki 1995 in Coulter 2006:31), not as 
combatants and agents with their own agenda. Women who fight in armed combat, or have 
roles as cooks, nurses, domestics, sex-workers and willingly or unwillingly support 
combatants, are a group that do not fit the social stereotypes of the peaceful, nurturing and 
´good woman`, and the literature on female fighters have accordingly been limited. Where the 
first generation of DDR scholars focused on specific aspects of the DDR process, there is now 
moreover a focus on investigating the programme’s contribution to security and war non-
recurrence, and the effect the programme has on the beneficiaries (Muggah 2010:6-7). This 
mirrors the fact that evidence of whether or not the programme has worked as intended has 
been lacking, in spite of it being viewed as some kind of “magic bullet” in peacekeeping 
operations (ibid.). There has also been a considerable expansion in terms of which disciplines 
the researchers on DDR represent, something that has resulted in new issues being included in 
DDR research. The topic of child soldiers has for instance been high on the agenda, but 
gender perspectives have to a large extent been absent. The studies that are done on this topic 
are mainly in the form of “best practices” and “lessons learned” documents. Through case 
studies, specific challenges when it comes to implementing resolution 1325 are pointed to, but 
they are usually not lifted up to a higher analytical level.  
 
The few theoretical contributions on the topic are as mentioned positioned within a feminist-
security paradigm. Specht (2006:58) for instance states that preconceived notions of women 
as peaceable, passive, and domestically oriented tend to influence assistance and support 
given to women and men in conflict contexts. Female ex-combatants are not accounted for by 
such preconceptions, and as a result often receive less attention in reconstruction processes 
than non-fighting or civilian women. Jennings´ (2009a & 2008) securitization argument 
follows this pattern, as it states that the female fighters were disregarded because the DDR in 
Liberia was driven and justified by a security imperative. Jennings´ main focus has been the 
reintegration phase of the programme, and her findings are based on general data collected on 
the DDR process.  
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There is, however, a need to expand the explanation by including other variables. Findings in 
my data, collected specifically to shed light on the disregarding of female fighters, points to 
other explanations for the gap. There is a need to study all the phases of the DDR programme, 
not merely the reintegration phase, as there are possible difference when it comes to relevant 
factors affecting the implementation process in the different phases, but also the fact that the 
phases are closely interlinked. Analysing the (lack of) participation of women in the 
reintegration programmes necessarily also demands analysing the disarmament and 
demobilisation phase, since registering in the first phase was mandatory for participation in 
later reintegration programmes.  
 
Even if the process was security driven and justified, there is no contradiction between that 
and implementing resolution 1325 successfully, other factor must therefore influence the 
process. The political phenomenon under scrutiny is an implementation of a policy, and to 
frame the extended analysis outlined above, I will therefore make use of implementation 
theory. I contend that the two approaches are not only complementary, the security 
component can possibly affect both the “value” of some of the variables identified in the 
implementation theory, and conversely, the explanatory power of the security argument might 
be affected by the other variables. The assumptions in the security argument are necessary, 
but not sufficient explanations for the gap. By placing my findings in an implementation 
theory model, and drawing on the “securitization argument”, I can analyse the inherent 
challenges of implementing UN resolutions through peacekeeping operations, and the 
particular challenges of implementing resolution 1325, article 13. As Antonini (2009:208) 
puts it: The issue that may best exemplify the gap between prescriptions and accomplishments 
(…) is the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace, and 
security.  
2.1 The “Securitization” of DDR  
Even though there has been a paradigm shift in the policymaking on peacekeeping operations, 
in which they are now expected to both protect and empower, Jennings (2009a:475, 
2008:165) argues that the policies and programming of the Liberian DDR were being driven 
and justified by a security-imperative. This caused the reintegration programme to overlook 
the female ex-combatants, as they in general were not seen as a threat to security. The main 
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focus in the program was creating immediate security after a situation of war. This was 
obviously the priority in the demobilisation and disarmament phase which both had this as a 
stated goal, but also through the reintegration phase, which had as a stated goal to socially and 
economically reintegrate the ex-combatants into society. Jennings (2009a, 2008) claims that 
the reintegration phase was not driven by a long-term development perspective but rather had 
a short-term focus on creating jobs and offering skills training to keep the ex-combatants busy 
and thus preventing them from creating unrest. This becomes evident in the underlying illogic 
of a reintegration programme based on job training in a country where the unemployment rate 
is around 85 per cent.  
 
Training thousands of people for non-existent formal jobs would be putting the 
cart before the horse, were it not for the fact that the development aspect of 
reintegration was not the key consideration driving reintegration programming. 
Instead, the point was to buy time for the transitional and newly elected 
governments – seemingly ignoring the predicament that without jobs the 
protection provided by training lasted only as long as the programming.  
(Jennings 2008:162)   
 
Because of this security-focus the female fighters were overlooked, especially in the 
reintegration phase, as the underlying assumption was that the group constituting the biggest 
threat to security was the young idle men. This assumption builds on traditional gender roles 
where men are seen as inherently aggressive and violent and women are seen as peace loving 
and nurturing. Accordingly, young idle men, in this case the male ex-combatants, were linked 
to instability and unrest whilst young women were not seen as a threat to security in the same 
way. First of all, women are rarely allowed the “luxury” of idleness. Even though they do not 
have formal work or attend courses or training, since they usually have children or other 
family to take care of they are classified as caretakers rather then “idle”. This is a problematic 
simplification because it understates the complexity of women’s roles, and overlooks the fact 
that men to a certain extent are also caretakers5. Secondly, female idleness is more often 
                                                
5 Two surveys done on Liberian ex-combatants (Bøås & Hatløy 2008, Pugel 2007), and Jennings (2009a) 
qualitative study, find that also male ex-combatants have caretaking responsibilities. For instance, ”protecting 
the family” is in both surveys one of the most prevalent reasons stated for joining an armed group (for both male 
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connected to increasing prostitution, not unrest. The instability created by prostitution, a so-
called ´normative instability`, is not prioritised by the securitization of the reintegration 
project thus making men’s participation in the reintegration much more important then 
women’s (Jennings 2009a:481, 487).  
2.2 Implementing resolution 1325, article 13 
The field of implementation studies has developed from the beginning of the 70s, studying 
why public policies often do not have the intended results and the goals set at the outset rarely 
are fulfilled in practice. Building on different perceptions of what ´implementation` really is, 
two schools of thought has emerged, in which most scientists in the field can be placed. The 
two approaches, the so-called Top-Down and Bottom-Up, have developed different analytical 
models but there is still a high degree of consensus on the basic issues in the field (Kjellberg 
& Reitan 1995:131-132). 
 
Even though the two approaches to a large extent agree on the basic issues in the field, their 
definitions and delimitations are still clearly different. The top-down approach is based on a 
narrow understanding of “implementation”, defining it as the phase between the decision 
made at the centralised level and the operationalisation of the decision at the local level. The 
starting point for the implementation process is a decision at the political level, in contrast to 
the down-up approach which sees the decision in it self as less important then the process that 
takes place around the decision and the social and economical conditions it seeks to change. 
The top-down approach is also reticent when it comes to evaluating the general outcomes of 
the policies, as it does not seek to measure the actual results of a policy in terms of changes in 
the social, political or economic situation, rather it simply focuses on the compliance between 
the stated goals of a policy and the local measures. The focus is on how effective 
administration can be achieved (Kjellberg and Reitan 1995:161-163).  
 
My intent is not to make a contribution to close the gap of knowledge when it comes to 
whether or not the DDR programmes in fact work as intended or not, but rather an attempt to 
analyse why there is a gap between policy prescriptions and performance. I am moreover not 
                                                                                                                                                   
and female ex-combatants in Pugel’s survey, while the data is not gender disaggregated in Bøås & Hatløy’s 
survey), something that Jennings (2009a:481) argues is an indication of perceived duty of care for the family.  
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interested in the processes around the adoption of Resolution 1325 and 1509, as they to my 
opinion are not particularly relevant to my research question. Furthermore, the general 
character of these resolutions, not addressing the particular subject of gender mainstreaming 
the DDR process on the ground in Liberia, but being more overarching, also makes the 
decision making process less relevant for my analysis. Thus, the Top-Down approach is the 
most suiting in terms of definitions and delimitations when analysing the implementation of 
UN resolution 1325 article 13, and furthermore the gender mainstreaming as laid out in 
resolution 1509. Within the Top-Down approach particularly two contributions have been 
important in developing an analytical framework and model for the implementation process. I 
will mainly utilise Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) model, as it is immediately clearest, 
supplementing with the insights of Mazmanian and Sabatier’s (1980, 1986).  
 
In their model Van Meter and Van Horn identifies 6 structural independent variables that they 
argue influence the degree of success in the implementation of a policy. The model both 
points to the relevant independent variables, and the possible relationship between them (Van 
Meter & Van Horn 1975:462).  Each of the independent variables is composed of a number of 
components. However, as the model is complex, Van Meter and Van Horn have summarized 
it and underscored the importance of especially three general explanations, that is the 
communication process, capability problems, and dispositional conflicts. This makes some of 
the components to the variables less important, and the focus will therefore be only on the 
components identified as most important to the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325. To 
I have furthermore chosen to make use of a simplified version of Van Meter & Van Horn’s 
model, developed by Kjellberg & Reitan (1995:143) that leaves out some of the possible  
relationships between the independent variables.  
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Fig 1: A model of the Policy Implementation Process     
  
(Van Meter and Van Horn in Kjellberg and Reitan 1995:143) 
2.2.1 The Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the model is “Performance”, which assesses the extent to which 
prescribed policies are in fact implemented, and how well the implementation process is 
executed. To measure the performance, the extent of compliance between the stated goals of a 
policy and the local measures must be assessed.  
 
As defined in the introduction, my dependent variable is the ´performance` of implementing 
UNSC resolution 1325, article 13, applied to the Liberian context through UN Security 
Council Resolution 1509, article 3(f). The resolutions are very general in form and content, 
making it difficult to measure the performance of their implementation. What does it in reality 
mean to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants? To be able to analyse 
this up against some set standards and indicators it has been necessary to draw on other 
sources. In addition to considering the limited policy implications of the resolutions, I have 
taken a starting point in the definitions of ”gender mainstreaming”, as this is what the UNSC 
Resolution 1325, article 13 implicitly are encouraging the DDR authorities to perform. 
Furthermore, the overall implications of resolution 1325 are taken into consideration, as it 
calls for equal participation and full involvement of women. Through this, two main 
principles are assumed, against which the performance of the implementation will be 
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measured. Firstly, there is the principle of “equal participation”, signifying that male and 
female ex-combatants should have the same possibility to participate in the program, both de 
jure and de facto. Secondly, the principle of “addressing the different needs”, signifying that 
all the programmes in the process should assess the needs of female ex-combatants.  
2.2.2 The independent variables 
The first two independent variables are characteristics of the policy in question, namely its 
goals and its access to resources. Four additional structural factors are subsequently included, 
which looks at how the policy, with its different characteristics, is filtrated through the 
implementation process. 
 
1. Standards and objectives 
The first independent variable is a characteristic of the policy, as it elaborates on the overall 
goals of the policy decision and provides more concrete and specific standards for assessing 
program performance. Identification of so-called performance indicators is crucial as one 
assesses the extent to which the policy’s standards and objectives are realized and the 
implementation has been a success. In some instances these standards and objectives are self-
evident and easily measurable, but in most cases it is difficult to measure the extent to which 
the policy in question is in fact being implemented due to its breadth and complexity of far-
reaching goals (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975: 464). Variations here will be decisive for how 
the policy is being communicated and interpreted in the process of implementation. A clear 
objective provides both a standard of evaluation and an important resource for implementing 
officials (Sabatier 1986:23). The less clear a goal is, the greater are the chances of 
misconceptions and conscious distortions. Standards and objectives can not be carried out 
unless they are stated with sufficient clarity so that the implementors can know what is 
expected of them (Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:466). To determine the standards and 
objectives of a certain policy, one can use the statements of the policymakers reflected in 
documents such as program regulations and guidelines, which set the criteria for 
implementation. In some cases the standards and objectives are not explicit, but must be 
deduced by the individual researcher (ibid:465). 
 
27 
 
As pointed to in the preceding paragraph on the dependent variable, the standards and 
objectives for implementing article 13 in Liberia are immediately unclear, as the resolution is 
very broad. This made it necessary to use other sources to deduce the implicit standards and 
objectives in the general policy implications of the resolutions. In the analysis it is thus 
necessary to assess the measures taken to translate the broad policy commitments of 
resolution 1325, article 13, into specific objectives and action on the ground, through the use 
of guidelines, “lessons learned”, “best practices” documents and policy statements. General 
UN resolutions that are being implemented through peacekeeping operations must be 
interpreted into context-specific policies, as context is a critical factor when shaping the 
design and implementation process, and for the outcomes of DDR (Muggah, Berdal and 
Torjesen 2009:273-277). I have also looked at the steps taken to adjust the mandate of gender 
mainstreaming to the Liberian context, and how one planned to reach and address the 
different needs of female ex-combatants. In addition to assessing the clarity of the standards 
and objectives as outline by the Liberian DDR authorities, it will be crucial to consider their 
compliance with the general goals of resolution 1325, article 13, and resolution 1509, article 
3(f), defined in the preceding paragraph on the dependent variable. 
 
2. Resources  
It is not enough with clear objectives and standards. If financial resources are not made 
available to facilitate the implementation it will probably fail. Resources may include funds, 
but also other incentives that can encourage or facilitate effective implementation (Van Meter 
& Van Horn 1975:465). Analysing this variable includes looking at the general funding to the 
DDR programme in Liberia, the allocation of funding between the different phases of the 
programme, but also funding made specifically to facilitate the implementation of UNSC 
Resolution 1325, article 13. What is central here is not whether the programme in general 
suffered from a lack of economic resources, something that would affect the efficiency of the 
whole process, but rather if this particularly affected the gender mainstreaming of the 
programme. 
 
Van Meter and Van Horn also include access to human resources as a relevant component, 
but as it overlaps with one of the factors discussed under the independent variable 
“Characteristics of the implementing agencies”, it will be dealt with in that section. 
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3. Interorganizational communication and enforcement activities 
This variable concerns the relationship between the central and local authorities, and the 
distribution of influence between the actors to the process. If the process is centralised, with a 
hierarchical institutional organising guiding the relations between centre and periphery, it may 
increase the likelihood that the implementers (the subordinates) will act in a manner 
consistent with the policy’s objectives. As orders are not self-executing, one needs the 
presence of an action-forcing mechanism, and while superiors cannot command obedience, 
they have substantial capacity to influence the behaviour of their subordinates. The more 
decentralised a system is, with independent actors and units, the more probable is an 
adaptation of the policies according to the interests of the actors (Kjellberg & Reitan 
1995:146, Van Meter & Van Horn 1975:466-467).  
 
In addition to influencing the strength of enforcement activities, the institutional organisation 
also plays a role when it comes to the inter- and intra- organizational level of communication. 
The initial clarity of standards and objectives are of course important, but how the 
communication of these is conducted between or within the responsible organisations are also 
vital. If the goal and measures are unclear, different communicators can provide inconsistent 
interpretations of standards and objectives, making the implementation more difficult. But as 
communication is a complex and difficult process in which messages are inevitably distorted, 
both intentionally and unintentionally, the accuracy and consistency in communication 
strategies are vital in achieving a successful implementation (Van Meter & Van Horn 
1975:465-466).  
 
In the original context of the theory, the central and local authorities in question usually refer 
to the state-level versus the local level of districts and municipalities. Transferred to the 
international level and the case of implementing Security Council Resolutions, I argue that the 
“state-level” is the centralized UN apparatus with the Security Council as policymaker, and 
the “local” level is the UN peacekeeping missions, which is tasked with implementing the 
Security Council Resolutions. In the case of Liberia the local-level authority is thus the 
UNMIL. As peacekeeping operations are complex and broad programmes, there is in addition 
to the Missions themselves a range of national and international actors included in the direct 
implementation on the local level. Consequently, there is a need to analyse also the 
hierarchical structures on the local level. When discussing the inter- and intra-organisational 
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structures in Liberia, in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), especially two 
types of enforcement of follow-up activities are important; the technical advice and assistance 
provided, both by the UN Security Council to the UNMIL, and by UNMIL to the other local 
actors in the process; and the Security Council and UNMIL’s possibility of sanctioning their 
“subordinates”. The level of inter- and intra-organisational communication, in terms of 
accurate and consistent communication of the standards and objectives of the gender 
mainstreaming of the DDR process, will also be discussed in the analysis. 
 
4. Characteristics of the implementing agencies 
The characteristics of the implementing agencies consist of a number of factors, both formal 
structural features and informal attributes of their personnel. It is difficult to determine an 
exhaustive list of characteristics of an agency that can influence the implementation of a 
policy, but Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) have identified some of the most central 
characteristics. Both the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes, and 
the degree of “open” communication within the organization are pointed to as relevant. I 
consider, however, that these characteristics will be adequately analysed when discussing the 
previously outlined independent variable, and will thus not repeat the arguments here. This is 
in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn´s (1975:477) consideration of an overlap 
between the two variables on this point.  
 
The other characteristics pointed to as vital for a successful implementation is the competence 
and size of staff. Human resources are naturally important, but also their skill in utilizing 
available resources is viewed as critical (Sabatier 1986:23). A mapping of the human 
resources deposited to the gender mainstreaming of the DDR program, and the gender-
technical competence of the staff on the ground in Liberia will thus be conducted. This 
includes the technical capacity of the staff working specifically on gender issues, and the 
competence of the whole range of DDR staff, as gender mainstreaming a program demands 
considering gender implications in the planning, designing, and implementing. 
 
5. Economic, Social and Political conditions 
How will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation, and 
how does social, economical and political circumstances influence the implementation? It is 
argued that stable socio-economical and political conditions contribute to successful 
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implementation as changes can undermine the initial political support for the policy. Support 
of public opinion, elites, partisans (political/military), organisations, and private interest 
groups can also contribute to successful implementation (Sabatier 1986:25, Van Meter & Van 
Horn 1975:471-472). The support or lack of support from the transitional government, the 
underlying relevant ministries, the warring parties, NGOs and public opinion is of 
importance. Analysing the economic, social and political conditions in a post-conflict society 
like Liberia in detail is not a possible undertaking in this study. However, the conditions on 
the ground are seen as important in this respect only as far as they influence the capacity of 
the implementing agency (Van meter & Van Horn 1975:481). A thorough analysis is thus not 
required; an overview of relevant circumstances will be sufficient. 
 
6.  The disposition of implementers  
The last independent variable is one that all the other variables are influenced by, and must be 
“filtered” through, namely the perceptions of the implementers. Van Meter and Van Horn 
(1975) underscore three elements that affect the implementers` ability and willingness to carry 
out the policy, that is their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, their 
response to it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of the response. If the 
policies that are to be implemented contradict deeply cherished beliefs of individuals 
implementing it, they may attempt to alter it so that it better matches their convictions. They 
may also fail to execute policies faithfully because they reject the goals contained in them. 
Conversely, it may enhance the potential for successful implementation if there is widespread 
acceptance of the standards and objectives amongst the implementers (Sabatier 1986:23, Van 
Meters & Van Horn 1975:473). The attitudes of the implementers can come from the inter-
organizational professional culture or from personal interests. A negative attitude can express 
a sincere believe that the policy to be implemented does not serve the purpose it is intended to 
(Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:147).  
 
Analysing the disposition of implementers in Liberia first of all demands a specification of 
what bureaucratic level one wants to look into. Different types of implementers are identified 
by the theory, for instance the so-called ´street level bureaucrats`, which are the staff that are 
in direct contact with the beneficiaries, and the higher-level bureaucrats. As mentioned, 
“moving” the implementation model to the international level signify that the UNMIL are the 
main implementers of resolution 1325, article 13 in Liberia. In addition there are a number of 
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´street level bureaucrats` responsible for the performance of the policies, both UNMIL staff, 
staff in specialized UN agencies, and NGOs. Since the UNMIL is the responsible body for the 
implementation, however, the main focus will be on the higher-level bureaucrats, both within 
the Mission, and other responsible actors to the DDR process. 
2.2.3 Three General Explanations 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:478) identify a range of possible linkages between the 
variables, but especially three general explanations are proposed as instrumental for a 
successful implementation of a policy. First of all, an effective communication in the process 
is necessary, so that the implementers understand what they are supposed to do. This depends 
on the consistency and clarity of the standards and objectives; the institutional characteristics 
of the implementing organisation; the inter-organizational communication and enforcement 
strategies and the disposition of the implementers. Secondly, the implementing organization 
has to have capacity to do what they are expected to do, which depends on the access to 
financial and human resources, interorganisational communication and enforcement activities, 
the characteristics of the implementing agency, and the challenges and possibilities that lies in 
the political and social circumstances. Thirdly, the focus is on the disposition of the actors. If 
there is a lack of will to implement a policy among the implementers, it can make the other 
structural factor less important. However, all the other components of the model can also 
influence the disposition of the implementers (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:147-148, Van Meter 
& Van Horn 1975:478-480).  
2.2.4 Limitations of the approach 
Through applying this theory on many cases, one has found that having an implementing 
agency that is supportive of the policy has been one of the most important variables (Sabatier 
1986:28-29). Most of the other variables have also turned out to be of substance, but the 
emphasis on clear and consistent goals has turned out to be excessive. Very few programs 
meet the criterion of clear and consistent goals, either because it is difficult to get the 
necessary consensus, or because the subject under discussion is too complex to define clear 
and consistent goals. This will be taken into consideration when analysing the implementation 
of resolution 1325, article 13 in Liberia, but I argue that analysing the translation of the broad 
resolutions into context-specific standards and objectives to be applied in Liberia is still of 
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relevance since earlier findings (see for instance Antonini 2008 and Raven-Roberts 2005) 
have shown that the lack of conceptual coherence has been a problem in the process of 
implementing gender mainstreaming. 
 
The fundamental critique coming from the bottom-up approach has been that the model, 
through taking a starting point in the perspective of central decision-makers, tends to neglect 
other actors (Sabatier 1986:30). Implicitly arguing for a stronger hierarchical and centralised 
control, it emphasises the institutional aspects of the implementation process, and especially 
the superior control. An excessive focus on this can be misleading, as modern bureaucracies 
to a large extent has moved away from detailed control to more indirect forms of control and 
framework administering. It is an empirical question whether hierarchical control and a more 
distinct management lead to quicker and more efficient results than the more decentralised 
administration. Consequently, implementing policies often require making compromises both 
when it comes to defining the needs to be fulfilled (in a lack of clear and consistent goals) and 
when it comes to the degree of central control (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:164). The discussion 
on preferred institutional design, a centralised versus decentralised organising, can to some 
extent can be transferred to the situation of peacekeeping operations, seen for instance in the 
increased quest for local ownership. Applying the implementation model to a case of UNSC 
resolution implementation thus also demands consideration of this criticism. 
2.3 Summary  
Six structural and practical independent variables are through the analytical framework of the 
top-down approach to implementation theory introduced to complement the “securitization 
argument”, which explains the disregarding of female ex-combatants with the priority of the 
security goal rather then the development goal. Two characteristics of resolution 1325, article 
13, the clarity of its standards and objectives, and the amount of resources it made available, 
affects the ´performance` through 4 other variables. Firstly, a poor communication process 
and few available enforcement activities within the DDR authorities are said to negatively 
affect the performance. Secondly, there is a need of competent human resources to gender 
mainstream the process. Thirdly, unstable economic, social and political conditions on the 
ground might challenge the implementation, and lastly, the disposition of the implementers to 
the prescribed policies of gender mainstreaming affects the outcome. The two theoretical 
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approaches are of different character, but complementary. The ´priority of security` 
component is an underlying and necessary variable that must be assessed together with the 
more structural variables. Moreover, there are possible linkages between the independent 
variables identified in the implementation theory and the security component. These possible 
linkages will be discussed through the analysis, and drawing on the framework of 
implementation theory the identified relevant components will in the following chapters be 
examined, along with the linkages between them and the dependent variable.  
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3 Women in War and Peace      
The Liberian civil war started on Christmas Eve 1989 when Charles Taylor and his National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) invaded the country from Côte d`Ivoire on a mission to 
topple president Samuel Doe. There are different interpretations of the underlying causes for 
the outbreak of the civil war. A common perception is that it was deeply rooted in the history 
of Liberia, where the ´war ` of identity, what it means to be Liberian, has been prevailing 
since the creation of the nation-state (Bøås & Hatløy 2008:34). Though a country of many 
ethnic groups, ethnicity has not been a conflict line in itself; rather it has been a component of 
the identity dimension. This is connected to the question of land ownership, and was socially 
constructed through the administrative boundaries laid by the True Whig Party (TWP), who 
governed the state for the first 110 years after its foundation (Bøås 2005:77).6 In combination 
with a struggle for resources, this lead to a series of local conflicts that got tangled up in each 
other and nationalised the conflict, ´as Taylor´s rebellion against Doe´s dictatorship pushed 
the dysfunctional Liberian state over the edge and into abyss` (ibid.). 
 
By April 1990, the NPFL controlled approximately 90 per cent of the country, thereby forcing 
Doe´s U.S-backed regime to collapse. When the UN and the international community failed 
to act, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent an intervention 
force to Liberia, the so-called Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). However, ECOMOG failed to 
halt the conflict, and less than two weeks after their arrival, Samuel Doe was executed by a 
breakaway faction of the NPFL (Bøås & Hatløy 2008:34, Nichols 2005:111, Levitt 2005:206-
207). In the following years fighting continued between NPFL and the United Liberation 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a rebel group formed in 1991 by Liberian 
refugees in Guinea and Sierra Leone (Nichols 2005:111).  
 
In September 1993, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Observer 
Mission to Liberia (UNOMIL), but the war continued unabated between the ULIMO, NPFL 
and other warring factions. After 13 ineffective peace accords (from 1991-1996), the 
fourteenth made headway and led to an arguably genuine democratic election (Levitt 
2005:210) in June 1997, where Charles Taylor was elected president. By then the ECOWAS 
                                                
6 The TWP was founded in 1870 by the so-called Americo-Liberians, which were originally freed American 
slaves who settled in and established the Republic of Liberia in 1847 (Levitt 2005) 
35 
 
had already launched Liberia’s first disarmament and demobilisation programme, and in 
September the UNOMIL forces withdrew from Liberia. However, Taylor’s victory signalled 
nothing more than a continuation of Liberia’s legacy of authoritarian rule (Levitt 2005:216). 
 
The second phase of the civil war started in July 2000 when anti-Taylor groups, united in 
Liberians United for reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), invaded northern Liberia from 
Guinea. In March 2003 the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) emerged as a new 
rebel group, based in Côte d`Ivoire but closely linked to LURD. The final offensive against 
Taylor took place in Monrovia, July and August 2003. ECOWAS peacekeepers once again 
arrived in Liberia in august 2003, and through regional and international mediation efforts, 14 
years of devastating civil war ended when the warring parties signed a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana, on the 18th of August.7  The CPA called for immediate 
ceasefire, the creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and it 
requested the UN to deploy a force to Liberia to support the NTGL and assist in the overall 
implementation of the Agreement. Moreover, it called for the establishment of a National 
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR), 
who were to supervise and guide the implementation of a DDRR program with the support of 
UN peacekeeping forces (Levitt 2005:228-237, Nichols 2005:111, UNDDR 2006, UNDP 
2004:5). 
 
On the 19th of September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1509, which endorsed the 
peace agreement and established the United Nations` second peacekeeping mission in Liberia, 
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Its main mandate was to support the 
transitional government in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
ensuring security and keeping the peace (UNMIL 2010, Nichols 2005:109, 137, UNDP 
2004:5). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 The official parties to the Liberian comprehensive peace Agreement were representatives from the Government 
of Liberia (GoL), The LURD, MODEL, and Liberian political parties. 
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3.1 The Women of the Liberian civil war 
The association of women with fighting forces was a constant feature of the Liberian civil 
war. Their roles were multifaceted and varied from civilians, supporters and advocates of 
armed struggled, to spies, soldiers and rebels. It is, however, difficult to say exactly how 
many Liberian women who in one way or another where a part of an armed group. Some 
estimates say that women constituted up to 30-40 per cent of the fighting forces (Amnesty 
2008:5). UNIFEM, in a 2004 report, operates with a number of women and children eligible 
for the DDR on up to 38 per cent of the total number of eligible combatants, which at that 
time was between 38.000 and 53.000. Conversely, in Pugel’s (2007:31) extensive survey, 
where a randomized sample is drawn from the universe of ex-combatants over 18 years old, 
only approximately 20 per cent of the sample is female.  
 
Determining how many of the women who actually fought and how many that “just” served 
in supporting roles as cooks, cleaners, sex-slaves, spies and carriers, is another challenge. Of 
the female ex-combatants in Pugel’s survey (2007) as many as 70 per cent reported that their 
primary role in the armed group they belonged to was as combat soldier, compared to 87 per 
cent of the men. According to Specht (2006:60), the majority of the women between 15 and 
24 who were part of armed groups did not take part in the actual fighting.8 Most of them 
occupied other roles, often as wives of the male fighters, with “normal” duties like cooking 
and cleaning, raising children and doing sexual favours. As Specht (2006:24) maintains that it 
was the older women who usually fought, whilst the younger girls more often served in 
supporting roles, the findings of Pugel and Specht are not as contrasting as first perceived. 
Pugel´s sample is of female ex-combatants over 18 years old, and one would accordingly be 
expected to find a higher percentage of women reporting that their primary role was being a 
soldier. Nevertheless, it is evident that the numbers and estimates on this matter are uncertain 
and varies depending on the source of information. It is important to note that the difficulties 
of estimating number of soldiers and camp-followers is not special for the women, this is a 
problem also when it comes to the male combatants, since the civil war had been long, with a 
character that made the lines between civilians and soldiers blurred.  
                                                
8 This is not to imply that the majority of women over 24 years were soldiers. The age group 15-24 years is 
simply the group under investigation in Specht´s (2006) report, and therefore the age group on which there are 
data.  
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It is, however, uncontested that a number of the fighting forces utilized women as soldiers or 
labour. A special feature of LURD for instance was that they had units wholly composed of 
girls and women, commonly known as the “Women’s Artillery Commandos” (WAC). The 
WACs were known for their fighting capacity and was integrated into military structures 
(Specht 2006:15, 23). Both Taylor’s NPFL, and later his Government Forces (GoL), also 
recruited women and girls, and had female commanders. The GoL had a WAC included in its 
military structure, however it appears that it played a less prominent role in the government 
forces than in the LURD. Some senior female commanders nonetheless took posts in Liberia's 
armed forces when Taylor won the presidency in 1997 (Specht 2006:23-26). Although all-
female units existed it seems they never went on assignments and raids on their own, but 
always had male units accompanying them. According to Specht (2006:23-26) this was 
considered necessary, as women were still perceived as the weaker sex unable to go on 
assignments themselves. On the other hand, women and girls also seems to have been taken 
seriously when it came to fighting capacities, and they were moreover seen as an asset in 
terms of their ability to encourage the fighting men. 
 
The reasons for women, as for men, to join armed groups were diverse. Some joined more or 
less voluntarily whilst others were forced (UNIFEM 2004:10). The practical boundary 
between voluntary and involuntary causes is, however, somewhat unclear. Specht (2006:10) 
underlines that the distinction is difficult to uphold in practice because recruitment that was at 
first depicted as voluntary at closer scrutiny can better be described as reasonable adaptive 
strategy or practical protection mechanism in situations of extreme danger or deprivation 
(West 2004:185 in Specht 2006:10). Bøås and Hatløy (2008) contend however, that although 
many of the combatants in Liberia were poor and had limited options prior to their joining 
fighting forces, they were not poorer or more marginalised than many of the individuals who 
did not join. The underlying premise is that even under some level of coercion individuals can 
have strategic or tactical agency, and the ability to make rational considerations when taking 
the choice of joining a fighting force.9 In their survey, Bøås and Hatløy (2008:38) find that 
                                                
9 ´Strategic agency`, is narrow and opportunistic, ´exercised to cope with concrete, immediate conditions of their 
lives in order to maximise the circumstances created by their violent military environment` (Honwana 2006:71 
in Bøås and Hatløy 2008:37), while tactical agency is more long-term agency based on some degree of the self 
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many ex-combatants seem to have made tactical decisions, based on security considerations, 
when joining armed groups. Even though the overall majority of the ex-combatants in their 
survey were male, there is no reason to believe that the premise of tactical and strategic 
agency is not also present for women who joined the armed forces, even though their security 
considerations might have been somewhat different from those of their male colleagues. 
 
Once again, the estimated number of women forcibly recruited to armed forces differs in the 
different sources. The estimate ranges from approximately a third of the female ex-
combatants (Specht 2006:28), to more then half of them (Amnesty International 2008:5), 
somewhat depending on the age group in question, as younger women were more often 
victims of forced recruitment. 
 
The fighting forces killed the mother, brother, and pregnant sister of “Victoria” 
(2010 [interview]), 27 years old and mother of four, in a church were they were 
taking refuge. She fled from the fighting into the bush, where she stumbled into a 
group of LURD combatants. Their commander forced her to come with them and 
she was given ammunition. She stayed with the LURD in the bush, serving as a 
soldier, until ceasefire came. 
 
Among the women who were not forced to fight the reasons given for joining the forces were 
diverse. Some took up arms to protect themselves and other women from especially sexual 
violence, or to revenge violence or killing of their family. The wish for equality with men was 
also in some instances a contributing factor (Brett & Specht 2004, Specht 2006:11, 30-32).  
 
When “Pandora” (2010 [interview]) was only 10 years old, she was raped by 
soldiers from one of the armed rebel groups. They also killed her brother in front 
of her, and “tied her mother down”. To revenge this, she joined the Government 
Forces and fought on the frontline for a couple of months until the ceasefire came.  
 
For many women, joining armed groups was a means of survival. Economic motives, deriving 
from severe poverty or the wish for material goods drove women and girls into supporting 
                                                                                                                                                   
and decisions taken, where choices are not ´determined by random factors they could neither predict or control` 
(ibid).  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roles in male units. A majority of the young women who fought in the civil war became 
involved through combatant “boyfriends” (Utas 2003:208 in Coulter, Persson & Utas 
2008:16). Some women formed relationships with male combatants with power to protect 
them, because the situation for young women in the war zone was very unsecure. Without 
such protection these women were at immediate risk of being violated and raped. Thus, many 
chose to attach themselves to a fighter, and sometimes women even stayed with men that had 
raped them (Specht 2006:11, 30-32, Utas 2003:176 in Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:16). 
Through bush marriages, where women and girls (forced or voluntary) married male fighters, 
they became dependent on the fighting forces, relying on them for protection and material 
welfare, acting as wives, delivering babies and supporting the fighting forces in various 
capacities (Specht 2006:12).  
 
“Princess” (2010 [interview]) was during the war captured by a soldier from an 
armed group because he wanted a wife. She did not carry arms, but stayed with 
the armed group for over a year, cooking and working for them. She is still with 
the soldier that captured her, and he is the father of her two youngest children. 
3.2 Changing gender roles? 
There are claims that war and women’s participation in war can change gender roles and 
empower women, as armed conflict causes upheaval that leads to new responsibilities and 
gender relations (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008:30). Women are often pushed out of their 
traditional roles when men leave their family and communities to participate in warfare 
(Puechguirbal 2004:47). However, it is observed that changes in gender roles induced by war, 
have a tendency to backlash as the institutional framework restricts the opportunities of 
women (Barth 2002:2). Reforms meant to support women have been ignored in practice, and 
there is often a lack of support in the local authorities. Looking at the changing gender roles 
and relations in Liberia, some of these patterns can be recognised. 
 
Prior to the civil war, the gender roles in the Liberian society were generally speaking of a 
“traditional” character. Fuest (2008:206) for instance find that the reproductive capacities and 
labour of Liberian women, according to the dominant cultural model, were subject to control 
by their elders and husbands. Many married young to much older husbands, in some instances 
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through arranged marriages (Specht 2006:59), and both offspring and property accumulated 
during marriage belonged to the lineage of the husband. Men were typically head of the 
household, making the major decisions and being economically in charge, whilst women 
cared for the children and ran the household (ibid:58). There were fewer opportunities in the 
formal economy for women, who instead employed informal strategies to generate income. 
Ideologically, women were considered to be inferior to men, and for instance not supposed to 
speak out in public fora (Fuest 2008:206-207). Subsequently, women, as a class, could not 
adopt public political roles. However, there also seems to have been unofficial “local 
institutions”, the so-called “Sande”, enabling especially elder females to accumulate resources 
and power, often based on claims to command esoteric skills and knowledge enabling them to 
control girls´ fertility and health (ibid.). Existing parallel to the traditional pattern of gender 
roles was also the Americo-Liberian culture, in which women had more extensive rights. 
Because of the rule of the Americo-Liberians, up until 1980, women to some extent occupied 
key offices in ministries, government, legislature, and university, as the Americo-Liberians 
tended to prefer their “own” women in high-level positions rather then Afro-Liberian men 
(ibid:209). 
 
In accordance with the general findings, the war in Liberia seems to have increased the scope 
of economic activities performed by women, political positions held by women, and women’s 
organized action in general. Since a huge number of the men were involved in the war, 
women had to take on roles usually occupied by men, both in providing for and protecting 
their families from the combatants. The war thus increased economic, social, and political 
mobility for women. Observers have been impressed with the ´emancipation` that Liberian 
women seem to have achieved (Fuest 2008:223). Because of these changed gender roles, some 
women found themselves in a position of being the sole protector of the family, being forced 
to make strategic considerations on the security situation (ibid.). These considerations 
sometimes resulted in women taking up arms or joining armed groups in non-fighting roles, to 
protect their family or themselves from rape, murder, and harsh labour regimes. Even though 
the war might have empowered and emancipated some women, a number of researchers 
underline that it is important to nuance this in terms of the social position of the woman in 
question, or, when it came to the female fighters, the different roles they occupied in the 
fighting forces (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008:30, Fuest 2008:223, Specht 2006:12, 58-60). 
Involvement in fighting forces seems to have empowered some women but rendered some 
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even more inferior to men then before. The few women who held positions as commanders 
and high-ranking officers were the ones able to turn the war into a successful endeavour, 
building up business enterprises, gaining respect, responsibility and power (Fuest 2008:210, 
Specht 2006:12, Utas 2003:212 in Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008). Conversely, Specht 
(2006:12) argue that non-fighting young girls in the armed groups were considered inferior to 
all other members of the armed group (…) Such girls lost independence, rendering them more 
inferior to men than before the conflict. 
 
Disruptions in gender roles that often follow prolonged conflict, can offer opportunities for 
reconfiguring those relations in post-conflict periods (Bauer and Britton in Fuest 2008:203). 
In Liberia, women from various sectors of the society assumed new roles and some could 
advantageously use openings provided to them by the war (Fuest 2008:211). Various analysts 
of recent history in Liberia (Dunn, Beyan and Burrowes 2001, Moran and Pitcher 2004, Ellis 
1999) have noted that women’s ability to live independently and the extent to which they 
have assumed leadership roles in civil, political, and religious sectors have increased 
dramatically since the war (Fuest 2008:201-202). Though still a relatively low representation 
of women in legislature (15 per cent), the female political representation has increased since 
the end of the war (Fuest 2008:203). After the war there has been an increased focus on 
empowering women, securing their human rights, and women have been encouraged to 
participate in the military and police. Furthermore, a rise in the percentage of girls attending 
primary and secondary school can also be recognized. This points to a change in the 
recognition of women’s social, economic, and political achievements (ibid:216-217). Women 
have also legally strengthened their position through the passing of an inheritance law, 
regulating women’s marriage right, property rights and access to children after divorce or 
widowhood, and a “rape law” (passed in 2006), turning rape in to an unbailable offence 
(ibid:219). 
 
Even though new roles seem to have emerged for women in Liberia after the war, it is more 
doubtful whether the patriarchal structures in society are changed. Some of the traditional 
structures of power and institutions, which have been dormant for several years, appear to be 
returning, though somewhat more contested then before (Fuest 2008:220). As war often opens 
up possibilities for women, and create changes in gender roles, the post-conflict situation, 
with its focus on restructuring and rehabilitation, can be misnomers in the case of women 
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(Chinkin 2004:32). When it comes to women’s roles in the peace building process; in spite of 
possibly changed gender roles during the course of a war, and very active women’s peace 
movements at the grass root level, when official peace negotiations start women are often 
excluded and their voices are rarely heard (Puechguirbal 2004:47).  
3.3 Gender mainstreaming the peace building process – the CPA 
The primary legal framework for all post-conflict peace building is the Peace Agreement.10 
To facilitate a gender mainstreamed peace building process, in which the various DDR 
programmes is instrumental, resolution 1325 should be incorporated into the peace 
agreement, as the mandate in peace agreements provides the basis for future legal framework 
and constitutional requirements, and gives legitimacy to the actions of those implementing its 
measures (Chinkin 2004:28). If the peace agreement does not mention women, not only does 
it ignore the mandate of UNSC resolution 1325, it also perpetuates and institutionalises the 
marginalisation of women in the political processes after the conflict (Lyth 2003 in Chinkin 
2004:29). Usually the existing provisions of gender mainstreaming in peace agreements are 
general, underscoring the importance of addressing the needs of women, but giving no 
guidance on how to do this, or more detailed answer to whom the responsible is. Also, in 
these provisions women are usually associated with the role of victim or part of a vulnerable 
group (Chinkin 2004:29). Depicting women solely as members of vulnerable groups, and 
victims in need of protection in peace agreements narrows the scope of their capacities in 
post-conflict situations and deprives them of their agency as vectors of change for peace 
(Puechguirbal 2004:47). 
 
One of the ways recognized to facilitate the inclusion of gender perspectives in Peace 
Agreements is including women in the peace negotiations and in the making and mandating 
of peace agreements. As mentioned, women are usually excluded from the peace negotiations 
in spite of active women’s organisations and changes in the gender relations. In Liberia, the 
active women’s movement made tremendous efforts to get involved in the peace process and 
gain access to the peace negotiations table (Puechguirbal 2004:47). The Liberian Women’s 
initiative (LWI) was created in 1994, speaking out against the civil war, promoting peace 
                                                
10 Peace building can be defined as action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict (Chinkin 2004:27) 
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initiatives and the participation of women in peace talks. Their advocacy strategy was putting 
disarmament before elections, and having defined their mission the LWI initiated a 
programme to assist in the collections of small arms. A number of other women’s 
organisations were also created during the war, like WIPNET and WONGSOL, pressing for 
peace. In 2000 a regional women’s network was even created, the Mano River Women’s 
Peace Network (MARWOPNET), consisting of women’s organisations form Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and Guinea. Amongst other things they advocated for the inclusion of women in 
peace negotiations, and in 2003 they were awarded the UN Human Rights Prize for having 
promoted human and women’s rights (Puechguirbal 2005:1). 
 
Nevertheless, when the peace negotiations started in Accra in 2003, the women were not 
officially represented, but they were active in influencing and monitoring the peace process 
from “outside” (Anderlini 2000:19-20, Puechguirbal 2004:53). As a result the Liberian 
women’s movement appear to have achieved at least some influence in the national peace-
building endeavours in spite of resistance from male politicians, and unlike women in other 
war and post-war situations (Fuest 2008:214). This can be seen in that the Liberian CPA, in 
spite of not having a general gender perspective, contains an article on the rehabilitation of 
vulnerable groups, namely women, children, elderly, and the disabled (Puechguirbal 
2004:55). Compared to many other peace agreements, it was remarkable that the Liberian 
CPA contained gender-relevant policies at all, even though it was typically unspecified 
(Chinkin 2004), something that Fuest (2008:214) argue must be credited to influential 
women’s organisations lobbying for female representation in the peace-building process.  
3.4 The Liberian DDR programme 
The legal foundation of the Liberian DDR programme is to be found in the CPA, article IV 
and article VI, and in the UNSC resolution 1509, paragraph 3. In article IV(3) in the CPA the 
warring parties requests that an International Stabilization Force assists in the implementation 
of a DDR programme, and the organisation of the programme is outlined in article VI. As 
mentioned, the CPA did not have any references to neither women nor gender mainstreaming 
in the provisions on the DDR process. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, resolution 
1509 and a number of other key documents laying the foundation for the DDR process did 
refer to the inclusion of women.  
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The DDR programme targeted the three main armed factions; GoL, LURD and MODEL 
(Nichols 2005:114), and the key objective was to disarm and demobilize combatants (…) as 
well as to prepare for sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants in 
support of long-term peace and security in the country (UNDDR 2006). According to article 
VI (8) of the CPA a National Commission on DDR (NCDDR) was set up, which comprised 
of representatives from the three armed factions, the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the National 
Transition Government of Liberia, the European Commission, and the United States and the 
International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). The NCDDRR was responsible for providing 
the overall supervision and guidance of the programme (UNDDR 2006, Nichols 2005:137).  
 
According to standard UN procedure, UNMIL was formally responsible for the DDRR 
process in Liberia. However, the mission in it self did not have all the capacity needed, so the 
work with the programme framework was in reality multi sectional. A number of the 
specialized UN agencies, the NTGL and national NGOs took part in the process and worked 
jointly, using their so-called comparative advantages to come up with solutions to the 
tremendous challenges faced by the war torn Liberia (Bose 2010 [interview], Aibinu 2010 
[interview], Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Together with the NCDDR, UNDP and other partners 
like the World Bank, EU and USAID, the UNMIL composed the Joint Implementation Unit 
(JIU), who was responsible for the coordination and implementation of the DDR programme 
(Nichols 2005:114, UNDDR 2006). The different actors were responsible for specific units 
within the structure of the JIU. The UNMIL was responsible for the disarmament and 
demobilisation unit, whilst the UNDP was responsible for both the “monitoring and 
evaluation” unit, and the “rehabilitation and reintegration” unit (UNDP 2004b:12). According 
to several of my informants, the UNDP took strong leadership in the process, since they had 
been present in Liberia for a long time. They coordinated the work with both a Needs 
Assessment done amongst the ex-combatants prior to the launching of the programme, a 
Strategic and Implementation Framework that outlined the policies of the programme 
(Muriithi 2010 [interview](Aibinu 2010 [interview]). Inside the UNMIL it was the DDR-unit, 
which by the end of 2005 shifted into the RRR-section, who was formally responsible for 
designing the DDR programme and implementing the disarmament and the demobilisation 
strategies (Koliab 2010 [interview]). 
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“Women’s issues” were handled through the Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) in the 
UNMIL, which was created in December 2003 (Koliab 2010 [interview]). The OGA in the 
United Nations Mission to Liberia was one of the first gender offices to be established in any 
UN Peacekeeping Operations after the passing of SC Resolution 1325. Its role in the UNMIL 
was advising and monitoring the implementation and inclusion of SC Resolution 1325 in all 
parts of the mission’s operations (Muriithi 2010 [interview]), and to facilitate this it 
collaborated with the Liberian Ministry of Gender and Development, NGOs, and counterparts 
in UN agencies (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The UN specialized agency responsible for 
women’s issues is the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Yet the UNIFEM did 
also cooperate with the UNDP and the Office of the Gender Advisor on DDR issues (Lincoln 
2010 [interview]).  
3.4.1 Disarmament and demobilisation 
The official DDRR programme began on the 7th of December 2003 at Camp Scheffelin in 
Monrovia. Over 12.000 combatants, largely government soldiers and militias, presented 
themselves for disarmament, overwhelming the facilities (UNDDR 2006). Not only was the 
number of ex-combatants turning up much higher then expected, but because of inadequate 
information problems also arose over misunderstandings concerning the benefits the ex-
combatants expected to get at the site. Widespread confusion, lack of food and water to the 
people waiting in line at the sites, combined with high expectations, lead to dissatisfaction and 
frustration amongst the ex-combatants. This resulted in riots at the cantonment sites, and due 
to the increasing threat of violence and general deterioration of security, the programme was 
suspended after only 10 days (Nichols 2005:109-113, UNDDR 2006). In January the UNMIL 
launched a nation wide DDR information campaign, to avoid unrealistic expectations, 
rumours and disinformation about the process, and the DD-programmes were resumed on the 
15th of April 2004. The second phase of the disarmament and demobilisation targeted ex-
combatants close to Monrovia, and 4 cantonment sites were set up around the capital. Later 
cantonment sites were established in more remote areas and pick-up points were also created 
to prevent overflows at the cantonment sites, and to stop combatants from travelling large 
distances with their weapons (UNDDR 2006, UNMIL 2010). 
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Only combatants presenting serviceable weapons or ammunition were eligible to participate 
in the DDRR programme and receive the immediate cash benefits of USD 150. An exception 
was made for child combatants and women associated with the fighting forces, the so-called 
CAFFs and WAFFs, and disabled or wounded combatants. These groups could go through a 
screening process conducted by UN Military Observers (MILOBS), who were staff from 
different national contingents taking part in the mission. Through a series of questions they 
decided whether the women and children had in fact participated in the fighting or been part 
of a fighting force, and was thus allowed to join the DDRR programme despite not being able 
to present a serviceable weapon (Nichols 2005:138, UNDDR 2006). Because of the somewhat 
unclear and complex admission criteria, the screening process was in many instances difficult. 
In addition, according to a former UNDP officer (2010 [interview]), many of the MILOBS 
who did the screening lacked the sufficient English skills, and struggled to communicate with 
the beneficiaries. Furthermore, the screening task was sometimes outsourced to local NGO-
staff that lacked the training and authority to effectively identify and reject illegitimate 
participants (Nichols 2005:120). The relatively high amount of cash benefits given to the 
registered ex-combatants caused what one of my informants called the “benefit-syndrome”. 
To get these benefits, a lot of people who were not ex-combatants came to the cantonments 
sites and presented themselves as such, often with weapons or ammunition given to the from 
friends or relatives who had in fact been combatants (Koliab 2010 [interview], Rasheed 2010 
[interview]).11 As a result, a lot of people who had not been part of any fighting forces, both 
men and women, took part in the process, and benefitted financially and through skills 
training offered them at a later stage (Nichols 2005:120).  
 
Because the UNMIL had not gotten comprehensive lists of ex-combatants from the different 
armed factions, it was impossible to predict the number of ex-combatants that would take part 
in the disarmament. Coupled with the challenging screening process, this lead to an enormous 
increase in the number of ex-combatants, starting out with an estimated 38.000 combatants, a 
number that was based on discussions in Accra, and ending up with over 100.000 having gone 
through the programme (Muriithi 2010 [interview], Nichols 2005:109-120, Rasheed 2010 
[interview]).12 The UNMIL continued to disarm ex-combatants largely without incident until 
                                                
11 Farzana Rasheed, former reporting officer to UNDP officer (April 2004 – August 2008). Interviewed in 
Monrovia 02.03.10. Nahataba Koliab, DDR Officer in UNMIL. Interviewed in Monrovia 15.03.10 
12 James M. Muriithi, Gender Affairs Officer in UNMIL. Interviewed in Monrovia 11.03.10 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the DD programmes officially ended on 31st of October 2004 (Nichols 2005:109-114). The 3rd 
of November 2004, representatives from LURD, MODEL and GoL militias signed a formal 
declaration dissolving and disbanding their respective armed factions, which officially ceased 
to exist as military groups (UNDDR 2006, UNMIL 2004c in Nichols 2005:133). There was 
no doubt that at the time there were still a number of ex-combatants that for different reasons 
had not taken part in the programme and were not disarmed. The UNMIL therefore continued 
to conduct mobile disarmament operations in locations that were difficult to access for several 
weeks following the official closure of the DD-phase (Nichols 2005:134, UNDDR 2006). 
 
After the official ending of the disarmament phase approximately 102.000 individuals had 
registered, of which 22.370 were women and 2.440 girls (UNDDR 2006). The number of ex-
combatants that did not register is nowhere documented. Pugel (2009:80) has nevertheless 
developed a best-guess estimate through two nationwide random sample surveys in Liberia 
and findings by Humphrey and Weinstein (2004:30) in Sierra Leone, indicating that the non-
participation rate was somewhere between 11 and 13 per cent. 27.804 arms were collected 
(UNDDR 2006), signifying that only 67 per cent of those who were disarmed and 
demobilized actually surrendered a weapon in order to qualify for the programme (Nichols 
2005:114, UNDDR 2006). It is difficult to estimate how many per cent of the country’s arms 
were actually collected, but one estimate indicates that it constituted approximately 60 per 
cent of the total numbers of weapons in Liberia (Nichols 2005:125). The weapon-to-soldier 
ratio (0, 28) was one of the lowest recorded by a DDR programme, but this can at least 
partially be explained by the fact that the admission criteria allowed entry without serviceable 
weapons and ammunition (Pugel 2009:83)  
3.4.2 Reintegration 
The objectives for the reintegration strategy were twofold, first of all: facilitating the ex-
combatants in reintegrating both socially and economically, and furthermore, contributing to 
national security, reconciliation and development of Liberia through economic self reliance, 
dedicated citizenship and proper conduct (UNDP 2004)  
 
The first rehabilitation and reintegration programmes were launched in June 2004 open, only 
to the ex-combatants who had gone through the DDR process and thus received an ex-
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combatant ID card. The official Reintegration programme was administered by the UNDP, 
but there were in addition parallel programmes run by the USAID and the European 
Commission. The main options available for the ex-combatants were formal education and 
vocational skills training, and some opportunities of apprenticeships and employment were 
also offered. The formal education took place in schools across the country and lasted for a 
period of three years. If attending this option, the beneficiaries were supported in terms of 
school fees, school uniforms and allowance during the two first years of education. The 
vocational training was offered in a variety of trades, such as carpentry, masonry, tailoring, 
auto mechanics, and agriculture. These courses were usually held by local partners (UNDDR 
2006, UNMIL 2010). The reintegration programmes provided assistance to over 92.000 
beneficiaries between 2004 and 2007, and an estimated residual caseload was addressed 
through the final phase of the official reintegration programme, which was terminated in 
2009. This brought the total number of reintegration beneficiaries to over 97.000 (UNMIL 
2010). 
3.5  Summary 
Somewhere around 30 per cent of the fighting forces were women, and they occupied a range 
of roles in the groups, both fighting and non-fighting. The reasons these women had for 
joining armed groups were diverse, and even though some of them were apparently forced to 
join, a number of them also made strategic considerations about joining. This was to some 
extent related to changes that occurred in the patterns of gender roles and relations as a result 
of the civil war, when women found themselves to be the sole protector and provider of the 
family and joined armed forces for security reasons. The traditional gender roles that 
prevailed prior to the civil war was challenged during the conflict, but even though some 
changes seems to sustain after the end of the conflict, there are also signs of setbacks. The 
women’s movements who had been active in promoting peace and advocating for the 
conclusion of women were for instance not included in the official peace talks, something that 
contributed to the absence of a gender mainstreamed DDR mandate in the CPA. 
Understanding the underlying reasons for women’s participation in the war, and the different 
roles they occupied in the forces, are vital when evaluating the strategies to target them in the 
DDR process, and this will thus be used as a contextual framework in the following analysis 
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on the dependent variable. In addition the background on gender roles, women’s participation 
in the peace negotiations, and the DDR process will be drawn upon in the analysis.  
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4 The female ex-combatants & the DDR  
My dependent variable is, as outlined in the theory chapter, the ´performance` of the 
implementation process, that is to what extent there was compliance between the stated goals 
of the resolutions and the local measures. The literature and reports on the subject is more or 
less unanimous in concluding that even though the policies in theory prescribed gender 
mainstreaming, they were not effectively translated into action (Amnesty International 2008, 
Jennings 2009a, Mazurana 2005&2004, Specht 2006, Specht & Attree 2006).  
 
Through the interviews with key actors to the programme it became clear, however, that this 
“accepted truth” was somewhat more contested then expected. My informants had more 
nuanced views on both to what extent the local measures outlined complied with the goal of 
the resolution, and whether these were adequately translated into action. UNDP officers 
Rasheed and Aibinu (2010 [interviews]) both claimed that women’s needs were addressed 
and that they were dealt with separately in the policies, but none of them could remember 
what the policies in practice consisted of.13 My respondents from the UNMIL stated that 
efforts were made to ensure that the needs of women and men were met, and that the process 
took cognisance that gender was a crucial element in the programming. No separate DDR 
programs for women were according to them set up, but all the programs were encouraged to 
include a certain percentage of female beneficiaries. They admitted, however, that the gender 
mainstreaming goals weren’t fully reached, but maintained that women who had been close to 
the fighting forces and at the frontline, had benefitted from the process (Koliab 2010 
[interviews], Muriithi 2010 [interviews]). Representatives from the Liberian women’s 
organisations WONGOSOL and WIPNET on the other hand did not agree that the 
programme was gender mainstreamed, rather they claimed that in the practical sense nothing 
specific was done for the female fighters (Danuweli 2010 [interviews], Garlo 2010 
[interviews]).14 
 
Although the existence of a gap between policy and action is an underlying assumption of my 
research question, it is necessary to look into how the female ex-combatants were in fact 
                                                
13 Aderemi Aibinu, DDR Technical Advisor in UNDP. Interviewed in Monrovia 19.03.10 
14 Cecilia Danuweli, Programme Officer in WIPNET. Interviewed in Monrovia 18.03.10. Cerue Garlo, 
Executive Director of WONGOSOL. Interviewed in Monrovia 18.03.10 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included and addressed in the process to be able to adequately analyse the reasons for the gap. 
The discussion will be built around the two performance indicators identified in the theory 
outline, namely equal participation, in theory in practice, and the principle of addressing the 
different needs. Drawing on my fieldwork and existing literature, I will discuss why some 
women did not participate in the DDR, and the experiences and challenges facing the ones 
that did. To begin with I will look at if and how the resolutions and mandates of the DDR 
actors referred to female ex-combatants.  
4.1 Gender sensitive policy prescriptions and mandates 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the CPA did not have any references to neither women 
nor gender mainstreaming in the provisions on the DDR process. However, a number of 
references were made to gender mainstreaming in the resolutions and other key documents 
laying the foundation for the DDR process. In UNMIL’s mandate, UNSC resolution 1509, a 
general reference is made to UNSC resolution 1325 in article 11, reaffirming the importance 
of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. Moreover, in its article 3 (f), resolution 
1509 applied the specific DDR prescriptions from resolution 1325 (art. 13) to the Liberian 
context. It states that the UNMIL shall have the mandate to: 
 
develop (…) an action plan for the overall implementation of a disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed 
parties; with particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and 
women; and addressing the inclusion of non-Liberian combatants; 
(S/RES/1509(2003)) 
 
The first Progress Report of the Secretary General on the UN Mission in Liberia stated that 
special measures should be taken to address the gender-specific needs of female combatants, 
as well as wives and widows of former combatants in the DDR programmes. It stressed the 
importance of recalling, in briefing, counselling and training programmes in the reintegration 
phase, the different experiences women and men had during the conflict (Amnesty 
International 2008:22, Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:24). Additionally, both the “Strategy and 
Implementation Framework” (Draft Interim Secretariat 2003:64-67), the main document 
outlining the programme design, and the “Strategic and Operational Framework of 
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Reintegration Support” (UNDP 2004a:8), outlining the specific reintegration policies, 
included references and policy recommendations for the targeting of female ex-combatants. 
4.2 Equal participation – in theory  
Translated into action, the prescriptions in the resolutions, and the definition of gender 
mainstreaming first of all signifies that there should be equal opportunity of participation 
between the sexes. The female fighters had the right to participate in the Liberian DDR 
process on the same terms as their male colleagues, there was thus no ´de jure` exclusion of 
women from the programme. Looking at the wording in the Strategy and Implementation 
Framework (2003:64), the justification for a focus on women in the programme follows a 
normative line of argumentation (cf. 1.2), underlining that the DDR process must provide 
appropriate procedures and assistance [to female ex-combatants] on a basis of equality with 
male ex-combatants. Including women is depicted first and foremost as an end in it self, not a 
means to achieve national security, reconciliation and development. 
 
Based on experiences from other DDR process, for instance the one in Sierra Leone, high 
admission criteria to the DDR programme usually leads to ´de facto` exclusion of women. 
Many of them have occupied other roles in the armed forces then merely the soldier role, and 
therefore do not possess a gun to hand in at the disarmament site. This ´de facto` exclusion of 
women from the process was addressed in Liberia, as the admission criteria were broadened 
before the re-launching of the disarmament phase in 2004. From having to present arms to be 
admitted in the program, one could now hand in only ammunition or even empty-handed go 
through a screening process to be identified as a WAFF or CAFF. Through this change of 
policy one to a larger extent reached the women who had cooked, worked, and been sex-
slaves or in other ways were associated with the fighting forces. This lead to an increase in the 
number of eligible women from approximately 3.000 to approximately 22.000, constituting 
25% of the total caseload of ex-combatants (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview], 
Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Compared to other countries that had conducted DDR 
programmes, the admission criteria in Liberia were liberal, making the number of women and 
girls registering for the programme extraordinarily high (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Jennings 
2009:480).   
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4.3 Equal participation – in practice 
Even though the broadened eligibility criteria to the program theoretically facilitated the 
participation of women, the subsequent question is to what extent one in practice managed to 
get women to participate. The number of women going through the disarmament in Liberia 
was high compared to other countries, but what proportion did the 24.810 women and girls 
that went through the process constitute of the total number of female ex-combatants in 
Liberia? And how specifically did one go about to get women to participate? Former UNDP 
officer Rasheed (2010 [interview]) claimed that there were no mechanisms to make sure that 
women participated, and critical voices say that the information targeting women was poor. 
The estimates and numbers on this are sparse and uncertain, but according to Specht 
(2006:82-83) there could be as many as 14,000 women between the ages of 15-24 who 
participated in the armed conflict but that for various reasons did not formally demobilize. 
Doing a rough estimate based on Pugel’s average general non-participation rate of 12 per cent 
(cf. chapter 3.3.1) and assuming that women constituted 30 per cent of the total number of ex-
combatants, makes the non-participation rate of women as high as approximately 28 per 
cent.15  
 
To design strategies that facilitate the participation of female ex-combatants, it is vital to 
understand the underlying reasons for their participation in the conflict, their different roles in 
the armed groups, and their post-conflict situations (Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen 2009:273-
277, Specht and Attree 2006:219-220). The findings outlined in the following indicate that the 
reasons for female non-participation were diverse, and somewhat different than for the male 
ex-combatants, making special policies necessary. Shortcomings in the process of 
implementing the gender mainstreaming contributed, as we shall see, to some of these reasons 
                                                
15 When the DD phase of the programme ended in November 2004, a total of 101.495 people had gone through 
the process (UNDDR 2006). Using a non-participation ratio of 12 per cent makes the total number of ex-
combatants approximately 115.335. Assuming that 30 per cent of these were women and girls, that is 34.600, of 
which 24.810 went through the DDR process, gives us a 28 per cent non-participation rate for women and girls. 
However, as there were many instances of people benefitting from the program even though they had not been 
ex-combatants, the absolute numbers in the calculation are probably not correct, yet the relative estimates should 
be valid. Considering that there, according to Nichols (2005:120) probably were more civilian women 
benefitting from the DDR, then civilian men, being that the admission criteria were lower for women, the non-
participation rate for female ex-combatants may be even higher then 28 per cent.  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for non-participation, whilst others were caused by the circumstances but was not addressed 
by the DDR authorities. Drawing on Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) framework, a lack of 
specified measures, characteristics of the implementing agency, and the disposition of the 
implementers all seems to have had influence on the ´performance`.  
4.3.1 Misinformation about the process 
There was a lack of information and a number of misconceptions about the DDR 
programmes, especially on the broadened admission criteria, which lead many women to not 
take benefit of the DDR programmes (Amnesty International 2008:30). The perception 
amongst combatants, and even some of the UN staff, was that the DDR process was only 
open for people who had arms or ammunition to hand in. This was confirmed through my 
interviews with the female ex-combatants, as many of them stated as a reason for not 
participating in the programme that they didn’t have arms or ammunition. Consequently, the 
women that had not been fighting, but “merely” associated with the fighting forces, did not 
perceive themselves as a target for the DDR process.  
 
The UNMIL, NCDDR, and NGOs all worked on spreading information about the process 
through all available media and traditional communications means (Draft Interim Secretariat 
2003:28). Gender implications were according to some of my informants supposed to be 
considered when developing the information strategy, but what this meant in reality is 
nevertheless unclear. No specification on the matter was provided in the Strategy and 
Implementation Framework, or in official evaluations of the programme, making it difficult to 
specify how it was done and the challenges one met. RRR-officer Koliab (2010 [interview]) 
stated that it was difficult to get information out to the people on the ground, and as the 
widespread misconceptions show, it was apparently even more difficult to reach the women 
with the correct information. The NCDDR based their information spreading on ad hoc 
strategies to correct wrong information rather than on a comprehensive strategy, and when it 
came to women, no gender strategies were designed (Randall 2010 [interview]).16 Even 
WIPNET and WONGOSOL mainly gave general info, but also tried to reach the women and 
                                                
16 Lawrance Randall, Former Senior Communications Officer NCDDR (April 2004 – February 2005). 
Interviewed in Monrovia 19.03.10 
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encourage them to take part in the process (Danuweli 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 
[interviews]).  
4.3.2 Deception by male commanders 
As the misconceptions lead to a widespread believe that one had to have arms or ammunition 
in order to take part in the process, commanders and generals held a lot of power in terms of 
deciding who could access the programme. First of all the commanders were requested to 
generate lists of eligible combatants, giving them the opportunity to choose whom to register 
on the lists. Furthermore, the male commanders and generals were often trying to gain 
maximum benefit for themselves and their relatives, and thus either took arms from the 
female fighters, or refrained from distributing arms and ammunition to the women in their 
groups who had not held arms, and gave it to their relatives and friends in stead so that they 
could collect the benefits (Amnesty International 2008:31, Danuweli 2010 [interview], 
Mazurana 2005:33). 
 
“Victoria” (2010 [interview]), a 27 years old women who fought for the LURD in 
the last part of the war, said that when the ceasefire came and the disarmament 
started she was pregnant, and her commander took away her arms. Therefore she 
did not go through the DDR program.  
 
4.3.3 Stigma  
No matter how well done a DDR programme is there will always be a sizeable 
number of women who will not participate DD (sic!) because they simply do not 
want to be identified with the process.  
(UNICEF officer in Amnesty International 2008:33) 
 
Some women chose deliberately to not take part in the DDR programmes because they were 
afraid of repercussions and social stigma if they were identified as ex-fighters (Amnesty 
International 2008:18, Coulter, Persson & Utas 2008:24). There was a fear of what would 
happen to them when they came back to their community, and they were especially concerned 
that association with the DDR programme would prevent them from getting married 
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(Amnesty International 2008:33, Danuweli 2010 [interview], Muriithi 2010 [interview]). This 
manifested itself in women holding weapons or ammunition not going to the disarmament 
site, but instead giving their guns to related men that had not been fighters so that they could 
collect the benefits at the disarmament sites.  
 
The question of stigma, however, is a complex issue depending on a number of contextual 
factors. Ethnicity, which in general was decisive of what armed group one possibly joined, 
affected the level of stigma because there were different views within the various ethnic 
groups on whether or not one fought for a legitimate cause. There were moreover 
geographical differences, especially between urban and rural areas. Last but not least, the 
reasons for joining an armed group (Bøås and Hatløy 2008:49) and what role one occupied 
within the group were of importance. Based on the prevailing traditional view on gender roles 
in Liberia (cf. chapter 3.3) it seems that the problem of stigma was most severe for the women 
who for different reasons had joined voluntarily and been fighters (Lincoln 2010 
[interview]),17 even though male ex-combatants clearly also faced stigma. The women, 
however, had to carry an additional burden of shame for having played roles or carried out 
acts that were seen as unacceptable for women by their society (Amnesty International 
2008:5). Bose (2010 [interview]), senior Gender Advisor to the UNDP, underscored that there 
was more stigmatisation of women than men not only because they might have occupied non-
feminine roles, but also because of what they had experienced in the armed forces in form of 
rape, sexual abuse, and pregnancies.18  
 
“Pandora” (2010 [interview]), who joined an armed group voluntarily and were 
a soldier in the group, said that her community did not know that she had been 
fighting; therefore she didn’t face any stigma. However, she expressed that she 
was afraid that they would find out, indicating that voluntarily being a soldier 
could cause stigmatisation. “Dekontee” (2010 [interview]) on the other hand said 
that she had not faced any stigma coming back to her community, because they 
knew that she had been forced to join and work as a cook for the group she was 
in.  
 
                                                
17 Allen Lincoln, Programme assistant in UNIFEM. Interviewed in Monrovia 11.03.10 
18 Shipra Bose, Senior Gender Advisor in UNDP. Interviewed in Monrovia 18.03.10 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The complexity of the subject issue makes it difficult to say something general about the 
extent of the problem, however, there seems to be no doubt that stigma was indeed a problem 
for a number of women. Amnesty International (2008:6, 17) maintains that stigma had a 
significant impact on the female ex-combatants’ ability to reintegrate into society and 
underlines that it might have been a barrier to participation in the DDR programme. The DDR 
policymakers did, however, not acknowledge this possible problem and therefore nothing was 
done to address it (Amnesty International 2008:43), indicating both a possible lack of 
knowledge and a lack of commitment on the part of the implementers.  
4.3.4 Geography and the burden of caretaking 
The disarmament sites were concentrated in the more accessible areas of Liberia, and were 
supposed to cover huge geographical areas. This created problems for ex-combatants that had 
gone home to remote areas of the country, or that were situated abroad. Subsequently, as the 
time gap between the disarmament and reintegration phase was long, many ex-combatants 
went home to their communities after disarmament and found it difficult to return to go 
through the reintegration programmes (Amnesty International 2008:34-35, Specht 2006:91)  
 
“Rita” (2010 [interview]) handed in a weapon at one of the cantonment sites, and 
were categorised a child soldier. However, by the time the reintegration 
programmes started, she had gone to Guinea to find her family, and it was to far 
for her to go back to central Liberia to participate in the skills training  
 
These reasons for non-participation in the programme were obviously the same for both male 
and female ex-combatants. However, as women and girls were often sole caretakers in some 
form, either over children or parents, it was more difficult for them to leave their home to go 
through the programme far away (Amnesty International 2008:34, Lincoln 2010 [interview]). 
This was reinforced by the fact that very few programmes offered formal childcare. In some 
instances the women could bring their children to the programmes, but they nevertheless had 
the responsible of taking care of them. This lack of childcare prevented women both from 
fully participating in programmes and finishing the once they had started. Young women were 
accordingly at greatest risk of dropping out due to their inability to take care of both 
themselves and their children (Amnesty International 2008:6-7, 39-40). Unfortunately, 
women with children were also one of the groups struggling the most with being reintegrated. 
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Some of them were very young, and the children they had were often the result of rape. Many 
of these girls faced problems when returning to their home communities as their own parents 
often had problems accepting and feeling responsibility for their new grand-children (Clark 
(2010 [interview], Lincoln 2010 [interview]).19  
4.4 Addressing the different needs of female fighters  
In addition to letting and getting women to participate in the programme UNSC Resolution 
1325 (art. 13) prescribes addressing the different needs of female fighters. It is however not 
immediately apparent what these different needs are, but as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, DDR guidelines and “lessons learned” were utilized to translate the general 
prescriptions into concrete measures on the ground in Liberia. The “DDRR Strategy and 
Implementation Framework” (2003:64-67) drew a rather detailed strategy on how to deal with 
the female ex-combatants. A number of broad objectives of the DDR programme for the 
female beneficiaries are outlined, followed by a specifying of the measures with which to 
reach these objectives. The main focus is on the reintegration process, but some measures are 
also to be taken in the DD-phase; separate areas for women in the cantonment camps, 
“specific assistance”, psychosocial support and training on issues like reproductive health and 
gender based violence, facilitated by a network of women’s organisations. In the reintegration 
phase, specific funding is to be allocated to promote the female fighters´ access to education, 
training, and childcare to facilitate participation. Measures are to be taken to initiate family 
reunification and raising community awareness on female fighters. Looking at the measures 
that were actually taken in the programme, in the following, the findings indicate that a lack 
resources, capacity, and commitment amongst the implementers are decisive for the outcome 
of the implementation process. 
4.4.1 The Disarmament and Demobilisation phase 
To what extent the prescribed policies were implemented differed from facility to facility. In 
some of the cantonment sites there were female UN staff giving “specific assistance” to the 
female beneficiaries, ensuring that they were demobilised and catered for by women. Men 
and women were placed in different wings with separate water pumps, toilets and bathing 
                                                
19 Miatta Clark, Child Protection Officer in UNICEF. Interviewed in Monrovia 08.03.10 
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facilities (Lincoln 2010 [interview], Muriithi 2010 [interview], Specht 2006:95, UNIFEM 
2004:16).  
 
According to the women’s groups and the UNDP Gender Advisor, there were also 
deficiencies in the gender mainstreaming on the cantonment sites. There were usually no 
special health facilities made for women, who faced various physical problems connected to 
sexual violence, rape and fistula20.  There was a general lack of psychosocial counsellors, 
something that affected the male ex-combatants as well, but the brief counselling that was 
offered did not adequately address “women’s issues” like reproductive health and experiences 
with sexual violence (Amnesty International 2008:35-36, Bose 2010 [interview]). The issue 
of security was to some extent addressed through the separation of men and women. Specht 
(2006:95) argue that this excluded ´fear for violence` as a reason for non-participation 
amongst the Liberian female ex-combatants, something seen in other countries going through 
DDR process. Nevertheless, some female ex-combatants still experienced harassment and 
ridicule by men, especially when registering for the program (Amnesty International 2008:35, 
UNIFEM 2004:16). A few cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of women in the camps by 
the UN staff, allegedly also took place (Bose 2010 [interviews], Rasheed 2010 [interviews]) 
underscoring their exposed situation.  
 
An underlying and vital reason for some of these shortcomings can be explained by a lack of 
an agency or institution that took care of and had responsibility for the female fighters in the 
camps. In comparison, the child soldiers had responsible actors in UNICEF, Save the 
Children and other NGOs working on children, but nobody had a special responsibility to 
look after the needs of the women (Garlo 2010 [interview], UNDP 2006:3). 
4.4.2 The Reintegration phase 
No separate programmes targeting women were set up. However, they were encouraged to 
participate in skills training programs, which were supposed to avoid reinforcing gender 
inequalities in terms of the roles and possibilities of the women. Courses in traditional trades 
                                                20 Fistula is a hole in the birth canal caused by either prolonged labour without prompt medical intervention 
(obstetric fistula), or sexual violence (traumatic fistula). The woman is left with chronic incontinence, nerve 
damages, and in most cases of obstetric fistula, a stillborn baby (Fistula Foundation 2010) 
60 
 
for women, like tailoring, cosmetology, hairdressing, and weaving were offered to the 
participants, but they were also given the opportunity to acquire skills like mechanics, 
carpentry, machinery, and construction; typically “male” skills. Traditional gender roles were 
attempted challenged, and both women and men were encouraged to choose untraditional 
skills training. The most important thing was not to choose according to your gender, but 
rather choosing something that would be sustainable in the community (Muriithi 2010 
[interview], Rasheed 2010 [interview], Aibinu 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview]).  
 
The problems in the reintegration-phase were twofold. A large number of the women that 
participated in the DD-phase did not participate in the reintegration phase, based on many of 
the same reasons as outlined above; fright for stigma, geographical difficulties and the burden 
of caretaking. The long time-gap between the disarmament and the reintegration resulted in a 
number of the women going back to their home communities, making returning difficult and a 
new fear of stigma prevalent. There was consequently an apostasy amongst women from the 
disarmament to the reintegration phase, as just over 50 per cent of women DDR participants 
eventually accessed reintegration programmes, versus almost 70 per cent of men (Jennings 
2009:480). Additionally, the dropout rates amongst those who actually attended reintegration 
programmes were high, mainly because of lack of childcare, something that had severe 
consequences, as around 70 per cent of the women who went through the DDR had children 
(Amnesty International 2008:19, 37, UNDP 2004b:29). The male combatants thus progressed 
through the DDR process ahead of the females, as the females had a training completion rate 
of 10 per cent versus 18 per cent for the men (Pugel 2007:46-47).  
 
In an evaluation done by the UNDP in 2006 some of these challenges were identified, and 
attempts were done to address them. In the second phase of the reintegration programme, 
childcare was to a larger extent provided and skills training courses were given both during 
the day and during the afternoon so that the women with children could choose the best time 
to attend the courses (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Lincoln 2010 [interview]).  
 
In spite of some measures taken to address the different needs of the female ex-combatants, 
the main focus and a preoccupation amongst the implementers seems to have been the 
quantifiable measuring of the proportion of women participating in the different programmes 
and projects (Koliab 2010 [interview]). In all the programmes the UNMIL supported, also the 
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programmes contracted out to organisations or private partners, the mission encouraged that 
at least 30 per cent of the employees should be women, so that the women could benefit from 
these programmes (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The gender mainstreaming was thus limited to 
ensuring that a certain percentage of the participants were women, instead of ensuring that 
they benefitted from it through addressing their different needs.  
4.5 Summary 
The broadened admission criteria introduced in January 2004, clearly facilitated the inclusion 
of female ex-combatants, and made the number of participating women relatively high in 
Liberia. However, there was a lack of specific strategies to “recruit” women. Some of the 
reasons the female fighters had for not participating were reasons shared with male ex-
combatants, but a number of them also specifically female connected to stigma, the burden of 
caretaking, and misinformation caused by a lack of gender sensitive information on the 
process. In the cantonment camps women and men were placed in different areas, but there 
were shortcomings in terms of inadequate psychosocial counselling and security for the 
women. The reintegration process suffered from lower participation rates of women, and the 
gender mainstreaming in this phase in general resumed to getting a certain percentage of 
women to participate in the programmes. The findings can be grouped into three underlying 
reasons for the shortcomings in the process, namely a lack of capacity on how to do gender 
mainstreaming, a lack of resources, and a lack of political will. These are partly in accordance 
with Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) three general explanations for an unsuccessful 
implementation; poor communication, lack of capability, and the disposition of the 
implementers. 
  
The conclusion that the implementation performance was rather weak is thus based on 
assessment of the two performance indicators. Firstly, there was a lack of specified measures 
to ensure the participation of female ex-combatants, resulting in a lower participation rate and 
a higher drop-out rate amongst the female ex-combatants. Secondly, the specific measures 
outlined to address different needs of the female ex-combatants in the process were not 
adequately translated into action, especially in the reintegration phase of the program.  
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5 Explaining the gap       
The shortcomings in the implementation process appear to be caused by a combination of 
factors of institutional, structural and personal character. Findings in my data point to the lack 
of resources, capacity and commitment as some of the most important explanations. The 
variables are interlinked; affecting both each other and the performance of implementing 
resolution 1325, article 13. To systemize and analyse these explanations, Jennings´ 
securitization argument is the point of departure, complementing with the implementation 
theoretical framework.  
5.1 A Security-driven process? 
Though having two official goals, a security and a development goal, Jennings (2009a, 2008) 
argues that the DDR process was security-driven and security-justified activity. The 
developmental goal was ´instrumentalised` in favour of a security agenda, causing a 
disregarding of the female ex-combatants as they are not seen as a severe threat to security. 
Informants from the UNMIL and UNDP clearly supported this perception, underlining that 
both UNMIL and the Liberian government were pre-occupied with security, seeing it as the 
main issue of the process (Koliab 2010 [interview]). Bose (2010 [interview]), the Gender 
Advisor to the UNDP, confirmed that security understood in a conventional manner, was the 
most important goal of the DDR process. Referring to human security, Bose elaborated on the 
security concept in question as an exclusive and “malestream” understanding of security,21 
biased against women. Some of my other informants, on the other hand, maintained that the 
two goals were equally important, and moreover, closely interlinked, demanding a fulfilment 
of both to achieve success. 
 
The main argument to support the securitization hypothesis is the lack of logic connected to 
the chosen form of reintegration programmes. The reintegration programme was not 
sustainable, and Jennings´ (2009a, 2008) thus assumes that the reason for launching it must 
have been something else then empowering the ex-combatants, namely creating security. The 
                                                
21 ”Malestream” refers to and plays on the concept ”mainstream”, understood as the common current of thought 
of the majority, in this case the “traditional security concept”. Conversely “human security” is a broader security 
concept, focusing on individuals instead of states, and a broader range of threats then only war. 
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programmes were meant to temporarily give the ex-combatants something to do, removing 
idleness and preventing instability (ibid:477). Former UNDP officer Rasheed (2010 
[interview]) referred to the reasoning behind the skills training in the reintegration phase 
being based on a security-driven assumption of idleness leading to unrest, in spite of the 
programme’s apparent civilian character, and a supposedly broader goal of empowerment and 
development. According to Aibinu (2010 [interview]) the reintegration was first and foremost 
about creating short-time jobs, and Rasheed maintained that the focus on job-emergency and 
training courses was an attempt to keep the ex-combatants busy so that the presidential 
elections could be held in 2005. Even the donors to the program allegedly expressed that this 
was the purpose of the reintegration programmes:  
 
What was the RR really, donors even said officially: “It’s just to keep people busy 
until we have the elections. It’s just to make people happy. We did something to 
keep the ex-combatants happy. We have grabbed all the guns; we managed to 
rehabilitate some ex-combatants. Now we can have elections.” The security-
perspective was the most important, to keep these guys busy until we have 
elections.  
        Rasheed (2010 [interview])  
 
Interestingly, the wording Rasheed used when talking about the ex-combatants in this context 
was “these guys”, indicating a perception of male ex-combatants as being the primary 
security threat, not female ex-combatant. This also supports Jennings´ argument that there is a 
perception amongst the policy-making and implementing actors in the DDR process that 
idleness leads to instability and unrest, and that the male ex-combatants is the group most 
likely to create unrest if left idle. Seeing that the Liberian society, in spite of some changes 
caused by the war (cf. chapter 3.2), is still traditional when it comes to gender roles, a general 
perception of women as inherently peaceful seems plausible. I moreover argue that justifying 
the inclusion of women in the program based on a normative line of argumentation (cf. 4.2) 
implicitly acknowledge that this perception is prevailing also amongst the DDR decision-
makers. When inclusion of women is “only” seen as important because equality of men and 
women is a goal in itself, not because it is vital to ensure national security, it clearly indicates 
that women are not perceived as a great threat to security. 
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Looking beyond the illogic of the reintegration programme, the distribution of funding and 
resources between the phases of the DDR points to a security focus in the whole programme. 
The disarmament and demobilization phase, which have an outspoken security-focus, got the 
highest funding. The financial resources were poured in at the beginning, but when the DD 
process was over and the reintegration process began with a two-fold goal of empowerment 
and security, there were less financial resources available (Rasheed 2010 [interview]). This 
was partly caused by the increased caseload of beneficiaries, an issue that will be discussed 
more thoroughly later in this chapter (cf. chapter 5.2.2), but was also a result of the general 
prioritization of security, as the initial funding was not followed-up by the donors in the 
reintegration phase.  
 
Finding support in my data to the securitization argument and its underlying assumption, the 
priority of security will be drawn upon as an underlying variable when the importance of 
structural, institutional, personal and contextual factors in the implementation process is 
analysed through the analytical framework of implementation theory. 
5.2 The Policy Implementation process 
The policy implementation process, when the policy is an UN resolution, is argued to be very 
challenging because of the institutional structures, the circumstances on the ground, and the 
lack of resources. Implementing UN resolutions concerning gender mainstreaming is even 
more challenging, because an additional lack of conceptual coherence, technical capacity and 
a bias against gender equality in the UN system (Antonini 2009:208). Through the analytical 
framework of top-down implementation theory the reasons for the shortcomings outlined in 
the previous chapter can be systemized, examined and evaluated more thoroughly. 
5.2.1 Standards and objectives 
The clearer and more consistent the goal of a policy prescription is, the easier it is to 
successfully implement it. Case studies of UN peacekeeping operations shows that one of the 
main challenges is the absence of a common understanding of the different mandates of a 
mission, resulting in difficulties in defining priorities, and a unified strategy (Antonini 
2009:XXVIII). This is caused, amongst other things, by a legal framework that is very broad 
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and general, leaving it up to the UN peacekeeping authorities in the country in question to 
interpret the resolutions, and adjust them to the context on the ground. To facilitate this the 
implementers on the ground must use guidelines, “lessons learned” documents, and program 
regulations to make them explicit (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:465).  
 
Researchers argue that there is no consensus on how one in practice should include women in 
DDR, as many of the UN agencies still lack precise operating standard procedures, 
frameworks, guidelines, and monitoring mechanisms. This makes the UN’s response to the 
issues that affect women in wartime ad hoc and patchy (Farr 2003, Raven-Roberts 2005:52-
53). As discussed in the previous chapter the policy prescriptions in resolution 1325 art 13, 
and resolution 1509 art 3(f) are very broad and general, stating simply that when planning the 
DDR process one must respectively consider the different needs of female and male ex-
combatants, and pay particular attention to the special needs of child combatants and women. 
The question is thus what the Liberian DDR authorities did to translate these broad policy 
prescriptions into action, and make them context-specific? Moreover, did they succeed in 
making the objectives and standards clear, and in compliance with the goals of the 
resolutions? 
 
A so-called Draft Interim Secretariat was created in 2003 to have the main responsibility of 
designing the DDR programme in Liberia. The Secretariat composed of representatives from 
UNMIL, OCHA, USAID, and UNICEF, co-ordinated by UNDP (Draft Interim Secretariat 
2003:2). A ´Needs Assessment` was done by the UNDP in 2003, which together with ´lessons 
learned` from other countries, especially Sierra Leone, was used to develop the ´Strategy and 
Implementation Framework`. The Framework translated the general UN policies into the 
context-specific programme to be implemented in the Liberian context (Aibinu 2010 
[interview], Bose 2010 [interview]). The needs assessment was done through an open, 
consultative forum where the UNDP tried to map the numbers and needs of the beneficiaries. 
It was however not an extensive, systematic or exhaustive report, but rather a brief overview 
based on information from meetings, consultations, and conversations with people, warlords, 
and the communities (Muriithi 2010 [interview], Aibinu 2010 [interview]). The problem with 
this exercise in terms of identifying clear standards and objectives for gender mainstreaming 
the DDR programme was, however, that the assessment did not focus on the differences 
between men and women. 
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Providing gender-disaggregated data and creating so-called combatant profiles in needs 
assessments are important,22 as it can help identify what the “different needs” of male and 
female ex-combatants are (UNDP 2005), and avoid homogenizing the beneficiaries. A 
successful gender mainstreaming, being more then simply an instrumental inclusion of 
women, depends on understanding the underlying reasons why women participated in the 
fighting forces, the diverse roles they occupied in the groups and the different consequences 
of their participation (Amnesty International 2008:11, Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen 
2009:273-277, Specht and Attree 2006:219-220). Since no combat profiles or gender-
disaggregated data were provided prior to the programming in Liberia, valuable information 
on the different needs of women was lacking, making it difficult to interpret the resolution 
1325, article 13 into clear and consistent objectives and standards.  
 
Consulting local and national women and women’s groups in the stage of programme design 
can facilitate the creation of clearer standards and objectives as they can provide specific 
information on the needs of women (UNDP 2005:36). The Liberian women’s groups were 
according to the Gender Office in UNMIL actively involved in the making up of the policies 
and also in terms of the interpretation (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). My informants from 
WONGOSOL and WIPNET did not quite share the same perception of the organisations 
participation. They asserted that they were not formally taken into the policymaking process, 
but that they were included by the UNMIL, after the policies were made, to help raise 
awareness and spread information about the policies (Danuweli 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 
[interview]). It is difficult to reveal to what extent women’s organisations and women were 
taken into the program designing, but according to information Nichols (2005:128) and 
Amnesty International (2008:22-24) have gotten from key-actors, they were not sufficiently 
involved in the planning and policy making process. Neither the UNIFEM, nor the Gender 
Office had come to Liberia when the needs assessment were undertaken, and could therefore 
not participate or advice the mission and UNDP on the designing of the programme. 
 
In spite of these alleged shortcomings in the challenging process of translating the broad 
prescriptions into clear standards and objectives, the “Strategy and Implementation 
                                                
22 According to the UNDP (2005:21) combatant profiles should illuminate factors like the combatants role in the 
forces, whether they have been part-time or full-time fighters, length of their stay in the forces, and to what 
extent they have been alienated from their traditional support network during the conflict.  
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Framework” (2003:64-67), outlines a rather detailed strategy on how to deal with the female 
ex-combatants, specifying the measures and objectives to address the different needs of 
female ex-combatants (cf. chapter 4.4). The problem is, however, that these are not fully in 
compliance with the overall goals of the resolutions, as they are defined in chapter 2.2.1 as 
equal participation in theory and practice and ´addressing the different needs. When 
comparing the specific measures outlined in the Framework with these performance 
indicators, there are clearly some shortcomings. The main drawback is that the component of 
´de facto` participation of women are overlooked. There are no provisions on how to reach 
female ex-combatants and make them participate in the DDR programme, and their different 
reasons for not participating in the process are not reflected upon. Seen in retrospect, such a 
specific strategy was apparently needed, as several of the reasons for non-participation were 
specific to the female ex-combatants. This shortcoming thus contributed to a much lower 
participation rate amongst female then male ex-combatants (cf. chapter 4.3).  
5.2.2 Resources  
In light of the development the last decade, where peacekeeping operations have become 
broader in terms of tasks and goals, Schori (in Antoninin 2009) argues that the UN 
peacekeeping mission are becoming overstretched and under-funded, leading to a gap 
between the “noble prescriptions” in the SC Resolutions and the possibility of action on the 
ground. Consequently, increased funding and resources should accompany the broadened 
tasks to minimize the gap between prescribed policies and results (Antonini 2009, Vignard 
2003:2). A number of my respondents pointed to a lack of economic resources as a 
contributory reason for amongst other things not mapping the different needs of the female 
ex-combatants, not having a strategy for gender sensitized information spreading (Randall 
2010 [interview]) and for the limited psychosocial component in all the phases of the program 
(Koliab 2010 [interview]). Closely interlinked with the actual funding is of course the equally 
important human resources specially deposited to facilitate the implementation. Though 
somewhat problematic to separate from economic resources, this issue will be dealt with 
under paragraph 4 in this section. 
 
The DDR programme was a multi-lateral effort by a range of actors besides the UN, and the 
donors were also numerous. UNDP managed and administered the multi-donor Liberia DDR 
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Trust Fund, a fund where the key donors included the European Commission, USAID, in 
addition to other international and national implementing partners. All the military-related 
activities of the disarmament was financed by the assessed budget of UNMIL, whilst the 
civilian-related demobilisation activities, which included specific gender and children related 
services, and reintegration activities, were financed by the multi-donor Liberia DDRR Trust 
Fund (UNDP 2004b:6-8). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Strategic and 
Implementation Framework (2003:65-67) prescribes separate funding to support women’s 
access to education and training in the reintegration phase and their starting up of businesses. 
Determining if this earmarked funding was sufficient to start with is difficult, but according to 
some of my informants it was not adequate, and as we shall see, the general cause for funding 
shortage especially affected the female ex-combatants. 
 
The greatest financial problems for the DDR programme in general resulted from the 
increased caseload of ex-combatants going through the DDR process. The planning and 
budgets of the programme were based on the first estimated number of beneficiaries, and 
when that increased, the DDR authorities soon found themselves in a funding shortage, 
leading to a bigger piece of the “budgetary pie” being spent on disarmament and 
demobilisation than initially planned. Many of the problems experienced later in the 
programme were a consequence of this. It was for instance necessary to shorten the length of 
the participants´ stay in the cantonment sites from 30 to only 5 days, and limit the 
psychosocial component (Aibinu 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview], Koliab 2010 
[interview], UNDP 2006:12).  
 
Though being a general problem in the DDR process, numbers indicate that the lack of 
financial resources affected the implementation of resolution 1325, article 13 
disproportionately. An even grosser under-estimate of eligible women than men to the 
programme, made the funding allocated to cover female beneficiaries inadequate (Amnesty 
International 2008:23). The initial target was set at 2000 female ex-combatants to be 
demobilized, and though this measure marked an improvement from other DDR processes it 
did not at all reflect the actual proportion of female ex-combatants in the Liberian conflict 
(UNIFEM 2004:12). Looking at the numbers it is startling how much lower, in relative terms, 
the estimate of female ex-combatants were compared to the estimate of the male ex-
combatants. The initial estimate of 2.000 constituted only 9 per cent of the final number of 
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women going through the process (22.370), while the initial estimate of male ex-combatants 
was approximately 35 per cent of the actual number going through the program.23 This under-
estimation was surprising as the Sierra Leonean DDR experience had shown that women were 
associated with fighting forces to a far greater degree than was originally estimated. 
Considering that one drew extensively on the lessons learned from the DDR process in Sierra 
Leone, this is an insight that could have and should have been incorporated when planning the 
DDR in Liberia (UNIFEM 2004:13).  
 
In addition to influencing the implementation process directly, making it more challenging, 
the lack of financial resources makes prioritizing goals even more important, as it influences 
the capacity of the implementing organization (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:478-480). 
Prioritizing necessarily involves identifying some goals as primary, others as secondary, and 
perhaps ruling out others entirely. Assuming that the security factor was the main focus of the 
programme, a lack of resources would necessarily reinforce this focus and further downgrade 
the goal of ´gender mainstreaming`, as one did not have capacity to sufficiently address all the 
goals of the programme.  
5.2.3 Inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities 
The level of accurate and consistent inter- and intra organizational communication, and the 
availability of enforcement mechanisms, influences the implementation of a certain policy. 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:466) claim that successful implementation often requires 
institutional mechanisms and procedures whereby higher authorities (superiors) may 
increase the likelihood that implementors (subordinates) will act in a manner consistent with 
a policy’s standards and objectives. Especially two types of enforcement and follow-up 
activities are important, namely technical advice and assistance, and the possibility of 
sanctioning the “subordinates”. The extent to which these activities can be performed depends 
on characteristics of the implementing agencies; the degree of hierarchical control of subunit 
                                                
23 The initial estimate of ex-combatants was between 38.000-53.000, comprising of 2.000 women and 
approximately 9.000 children and disabled (UNIFEM 2004:12). It is however, somewhat unclear what the initial 
estimate of child combatants and disabled were but choosing the lowest denominator, 38.000, when calculating 
to some extent equalizes this possible rise in number of children and disabled, making the calculation valid and 
useful to my analysis in spite of uncertainties. 
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decisions and processes within the implementing agencies. Transferring the implementation 
model from the national to the international level, the Security Council is the centralised 
“state-level”, while UNMIL is the “local” implementing level. There is, however, a need to 
analyse the hierarchical structures also on the implementing level. My intent is not to map all 
the organisational and institutional characteristics of the peacekeeping operation, but I will 
make some general consideration of the relationship between the nature of institutional 
arrangements and level of communication and enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Taking a starting point at the Security Council level, one of the problems identified by 
researchers when it comes to accountability is that the Security Council often share or even 
transfer their responsibility and support for Missions on the ground to other important 
international actors, multinational forces or powerful states. The arrangements to direct and 
manage the UN peacekeeping operations are moreover distinct from those of other 
organizations, due to the fact that the operations have evolved into complex and multi-
dimensional enterprises, involving personnel from a wide range of nationalities, disciplines 
and professional cultures pursuing multiple lines of activity (UN 2008:66). The operations are 
usually set up alongside a range of external actors, with widely differing mandates, agendas 
and time horizons. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is thus further 
compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the 
United Nations and the range of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflict 
and post-conflict settings (ibid:67). As a result, the hierarchical control and responsibilities in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations is less clear-cut (UN 2008:66), and enforcement 
activities, monitoring and communicating become significantly more challenging. Moreover, 
the Security Council’s ability and willingness to steer and orient the implementation of its 
resolutions and mandates often depends on the changing priorities of member states and what 
political issues that are high on the international agenda at the time (Antonini 2009:197).  
 
On the “local” level UNMIL was the highest responsible UN actor, but a range of other actors 
also had responsibilities in the process, and the day-to-day work with the process was multi 
sectional (cf. chapter 3.5). In addition, a number of local and international NGOs took part in 
the process through the mission’s outsourcing of practical tasks throughout the programme 
(Rasheed 2010 [interview]). The Office of the Gender Advisor (OGA) in the UNMIL had the 
specific responsibility to make sure that resolution 1325 was implemented throughout the 
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mission, and in the DDR programming. The OGA did not have executive power, so in order 
to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, it based its work on follow-up activities; 
awareness raising, training and capacity building, technical advise, and monitoring. Through 
these measures the OGA worked to ensure that the staff in the Mission had skills and 
knowledge to understand and address gender issues (UNMIL 2010). Everyone who came to 
work within the mission was trained in SC Resolution 1325, and in how gender should be 
implemented in the mission. Interestingly, the so-called introduction training only lasted for 
one hour, and the so-called contingents, the groups sent specifically from nation-states to 
support the mission, were not trained by UNMIL (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The military 
observers (MILOBS) that worked on the ground, for instance with the screening process in 
the disarmament camps, came from these national contingents and consequently did not 
receive formal training on gender from the UNMIL. Another problem was that the Gender 
Office didn’t have staff in all the counties DDR programmes were set up. Other sections of 
the mission therefore had to be responsible for monitoring and advising the government and 
NGOs on gender mainstreaming in those counties (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). Two apparent 
problems can thus be identified. Firstly, the range of actors, especially actors who were not 
from within the mission or the UN, made it difficult to reach everybody with technical advice 
and training in gender mainstreaming. Secondly, the Office of the Gender Advisor, the only 
unit in the mission specifically tasked to implement resolution 1325, was a very small office, 
lacking human resources. To be realistic when it comes to issues of integrating gender, the 
mission and the UN itself must also ensure that there is capacity to integrate gender in the 
DDR process (Muriithi 2010 [interview])  
 
The action-forcing mechanisms available and different possibilities “superiors” have of 
sanctioning their subordinates if they do not implement the prescribed policies, depends on 
how the implementing process is organised. When the implementation process takes place 
within an organization, the mechanisms are usually more efficient and broad. Specifically HR 
policies of recruitment, relocation, promotion, and dismissal are in use, in addition to 
budgetary allocations, reducing or inflating funding to units and field offices (Van Meter and 
Van Horn 1975:466). In the context of inter-organizational relations, many of these 
mechanisms are absent and the responsible organisation has to use other, less efficient, action-
forcing mechanisms, taking form of socialization, persuasion, and cooptation of other actors 
by the responsible organization. Using funding as an incentive or as a threat is also common. 
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However, recognizing the problems with efficient action-forcing mechanisms, employing 
reliable forms of monitoring and surveillance becomes important (Van Meter and Van Horn 
1975:467-469). 
 
Implementing the gender mainstreaming in the Liberian DDR must be said to be both an intra 
and inter-organizational task, and a range of different enforcement activities were available. 
However, some central challenges must be pointed to. When it comes to the important tool of 
HR policy, the system is somewhat different in the UN then in other, national level 
organisations. There is a formalized system of recruitment, but also other informal 
mechanisms that play a role when it comes to getting and keeping a job. Political 
appointments, donor and national government influence makes the general job insecurity high 
at all times among the UN personnel (Raven-Roberts 2005:55-56). In emergency and 
peacekeeping situations, like the one in Liberia in 2003, there is usually urgency in setting up 
a program and getting the right personnel, and established recruitment and evaluation 
procedures are overlooked (ibid.). This unstable system indicates that the action-forcing 
mechanisms of human resources policies, which might be very influential in “traditional “ 
organisations, may not be as effective in the UN. 
 
Monitoring is important in the context of the inter-organizational relations, but monitoring 
and holding staff accountable in the DDR process was challenging, as the range of actors 
taking part in the process was broad. The Gender Office cooperated with NGOs to monitor 
the process of gender mainstreaming, because there was not sufficient capacity in the office 
(Muriithi 2010 [interview]), but there does not seem to have been a coherent and effective 
system of monitoring. When work was subcontracted out to national and international NGOs, 
with different guidelines and operating procedures, the monitoring was made even more 
difficult. This is in accordance with other findings arguing that making sure that principles 
and guidelines are followed and monitored in UN programmes is a major challenge, since the 
number of actors is high (Raven-Roberts 2005:53). There is a lack of effective systems of 
management and evaluation to appropriately standardize principles of programming, monitor 
programs, and hold staff accountable for adhering (or not) to practices and overall United 
Nations goals (Raven-Roberts 2005:44)  
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The initial clarity of the standards and objectives is important for the implementers to know 
what is expected from them, but the accuracy of the communication and the consistency with 
which the standards and objectives are communicated are also vital (Van Meter and Van Horn 
1975:466). A range of independent actors and units makes the communication more complex 
and difficult, and in this context the policies are more likely to have been adapted to the 
interests of the actors. Having a Gender Office in the mission that took part in all committees 
and groups working in the DDR decision-making body to make sure the gender perspective 
was taken into account was a strong starting point for an effective communication process 
(Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The same problem as seen in the monitoring and follow-up 
activities are nevertheless seen here, as a high number of actors involved in the process, and a 
Gender Office with limited resources, made the communication process challenging. 
Accordingly, my findings indicate that both the inter- and intra organisational communication 
process had shortcomings. In spite of the rather clear standards and objectives laid out in the 
Strategy Framework, there is evidence of lacking conceptual coherence among staff 
implementing these measures. This is illustrated by the substantially different opinions my 
informants from the UNMIL and UN agencies had on whether or not the DDR program was 
gender mainstreamed and their difficulties with identifying specific policies targeting women. 
This indicates an inconsistence and ignorance in the judgment amongst the actors on what the 
gender mainstreaming consisted of. Another illustrative example is that some of the officials I 
spoke to, even the officials from the DDR-unit in UNMIL and UNIFEM, were unaware of the 
lowered admission criteria for women to the program. This points back to a poor 
communication process that seems to have been unable to adequately communicate to the 
relatively clear and consistent policies of gender mainstreaming to the broad range of actors 
involved in the program.  
5.2.4 Characteristics of the implementing agencies 
Lack of human resources and staff with adequate technical capacity on integrating gender has 
been pointed to as one of the biggest challenges in gender mainstreaming DDR processes (see 
for instance Antonini 2009, UNIFEM 2004). This was also a problem in the process in 
Liberia, both within the mission, in the specialized UN agencies, and in the national agencies 
(Amnesty International 2008, Bose 2010 [interview] and Muriithi 2010 [interview]). The 
Gender Advisor to the UNDP, Bose (2010 [interview]), commented that gender equality is 
74 
 
supposed to be done in the UN, so therefore people “do it”, even though they might not know 
how, or even think that it is important. But the intent in it self is not enough (Bose 2010 
[interview]).  
 
As pointed to, the fact that the UNMIL had a specialised Gender Office (OGA), one of the 
first Gender Offices in a UN peacekeeping operation, was a clear advantage. They had 
specified technical capacity on gender issues, but a small staff, and contributed as much as 
they could in increasing the gender capacity in the mission through training. The OGA, 
however, lacked a dedicated agency with capacity and resources on gender to collaborate 
with. UNIFEM came to Liberia in November 2004, when the disarmament was over, and the 
reintegration had started, and was not extensively involved in the DDRR process. This was 
mainly because of their late arrival, but also because of a somewhat different policy focus. In 
2005 their main priority was the legislative and presidential election, working for female 
participation and political empowerment, and especially the presidential campaign of Ellen 
Johnson Sierleaf. UNIFEM did not play the same important role in ensuring the rights of the 
female ex-combatants in the process as the UNICEF did to the child soldiers (Lincoln 2010 
[interview]). In that respect, the progressive and positive dedication of human resources to a 
Gender Office in the mission was to some extent levelled out by the lack of participation from 
the UNIFEM. One of OGA’s key national partners, and another actor working specifically on 
gender issues, was the Liberian Ministry of Gender and Development. The Ministry was 
established in 2001, and according to Bose and Muriithi (2010 [interview]) it was functional 
and very active in the DDR process. The Ministry, however, also struggled with a lack of 
human resources, but the limited staff that handled the ministry, and especially the minister, 
allegedly had the necessary competence on gender issues (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). 
Consequently, the pattern seems to have been that the units with the technical capacity on 
gender in general lacked the sufficient human resources, whilst it seems to have been vice 
versa in the executing units of the UNMIL. 
 
Drawing on experiences from other efforts to gender mainstream peacekeeping missions, it is 
underlined that for the implementation to be efficient all agency personnel must be exposed to 
and familiar with these guidelines, whether they are men or women and whether or not they 
are directly or indirectly involved in program implementation (Raven-Roberts 2005:53). The 
general lack of training and consequently of capacity on gender in Liberia was visible both in 
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the planning, implementing and evaluation phase of the process. In the designing phase, it 
was one of the underlying reasons for the shortage of adequate gender analysis, as one lacked 
people that could execute them (Muriithi 2010 [interview]). UNDP’s Gender Advisor argued 
that the needs assessment performed by the UNDP tried to take gender into consideration and 
adequately gather information, but because one were short of people with the right skills, the 
result was not satisfying (Bose 2010 [interview]). In the implementation phase one of the 
areas where the lack of training was visible was amongst the military observers (MILOBS) 
that were responsible for registering the ex-combatants at the disarmament sites. As 
mentioned, they not included in the “gender training” that was performed by the UNMIL. 
Even though they had the responsibility on the ground, based on their lack of training and 
their background in traditional military cultures, there is reason to doubt that they had the 
prerequisites to understand the importance of including women, or the knowledge of how to 
do it. In the NCDDRR there were also capacity problems, especially in the management 
structures, with a limited staff, with limited competence on gender issues. As discussed in 
chapter 4, the NCDDR ran information campaigns on the DDR programme, but partly 
because of a lack of capacity, they did not contain strategies to reach female ex-combatants 
(Randall 2010 [interview]). In the evaluation phase neither the OGA nor the UNIFEM did 
evaluations and reports on the program, because of the limited resources. Such evaluations 
could have provided important “lessons learned” specifically on the gender mainstreaming 
aspect, for instance on the issue of getting women to participate in practice, which the other 
general evaluations done by UNMIL did not provide. 
5.2.5 Economic, Social and Political conditions 
The economic, social and political conditions on the ground in post-conflict societies are 
usually extremely challenging and unstable, and the post-conflict environment in which the 
UNMIL was implementing the DDR programme was no exception (Pugel 2009). In a country 
that had been devastated by 14 years of violent conflict, the international ´aid and security 
architecture` had approximately four months to define a strategic plan that provided for 
national security, disarmament of tens of thousands of combatants, the return and settlement 
of hundreds of thousands of displaced citizens, massive humanitarian aid operations, and the 
establishment of conditions for free and fair elections. All of this was to be done without 
causing unintentional harm and preventing Liberia from sliding back into protracted warfare 
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(Pugel 2009:76). The scale of challenges for the UNMIL, international actors and the 
National Transitional Government was simply breathtaking. 50 to 80 percent of the 
infrastructure was destroyed, leaving the majority of the country inaccessible. Under these 
circumstances the actors had to plan the long-time reintegration of not only ex-combatants, 
but also internally displaced people and refugees (Pugel 2009:76).  
 
Attempting to include gender issues and gender mainstreaming the DDR process when the 
general challenges are so massive, have proven very difficult. Several arguments oppose 
focusing on gender issues in these circumstances. There is for instance a view that in 
emergency contexts there is “no time” to do gender work, as what is needed is rapid action, 
lifesaving food, and material distribution. Performing nuanced analysis and targeting change 
is too cumbersome, complex, and time consuming, indeed downright harmful to the “real 
work” of saving lives (Raven-Roberts 2005:57). This argument was also used in Liberia. 
UNDP Gender Advisor Bose (2010 [interview]) argued for instance that creating combatant 
profiles in the needs assessment was not even a question. In her opinion, the main question of 
concern at that time was rather how quickly things could be done and the DDR process 
commenced, because there was general unrest in Monrovia, and both male and female 
fighters were showing their discontent protesting in the streets (Bose 2010 [interview]). The 
feeling in the Mission of being “in a hurry” is also apparent in the fact that the first phase of 
the DDR program was commenced very quickly after the peace agreement was reached, some 
say premature. The launching of the first disarmament phase in December 2003 started before 
the sufficient numbers of UN personnel had had the time to come to Liberia, and with no 
monitoring system in place (Jennings 2007:208, Nichols 2005:110). It is assumed that this 
was driven by both donor pressure and as a response to threats from armed factions (Nichols 
2005:113). Through conversations with informant, my clear impression was also that the UN 
Special representative of the Secretary General to Liberia, Jacques Klein, rushed the 
launching of the programme.  
 
It is challenging to provide thorough data and conduct detailed needs assessments when the 
time is short, and once you start the process, you can’t stop it to undertake new needs 
assessments, because it can create unrest (Bose 2010 [interview]). Hence, the paradox and 
problem of DDRR program designing in unstable circumstances is that the mappings and 
assessments that needs to be executed for the program to be efficient and successful has to be 
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done quickly, because of the security situation (Bose 2010 [interview]). When the 
circumstances are of an unstable and unsecure nature, and the human resources are scarce, the 
need to prioritize again becomes more apparent. Building on the necessary condition of 
security being the main concern, limited time and resources thus reinforces this focus and 
provoke a choice of “either or” rather then facilitating a parallel focus on both security and 
gender mainstreaming.  
 
Looking at the support, or lack of support, of a policy amongst national interest groups, can 
shed light on how the policy was received on the ground. If there is support from national 
actors and interest groups it can positively affect the implementation of a policy (Sabatier 
1986:25). The so-called “cultural inappropriateness” argument assess that international 
organizations have to be careful not to impose their ideologies on the communities they are 
working in, assuming that feminism and gender equality are western constructions (Raven-
Roberts 2005:57). UNDP Gender Advisor Bose (2010 [interview]) pointed to this argument 
having been prevailing in the Mission to Liberia. This indicates a general judgment in the 
Mission of the Liberian society as having a traditional view on gender roles (see chapter 3.3), 
not one in which gender equality was a deeply embedded value. This can be identified when 
looking at one of the vital national actors, namely the armed groups. One of the factors 
pointed to as a reason for low female participation in the DDR program, was ´manipulation, 
corruption, and deception on the part of male commanders` (cf. chapter 4.3.2). Though it is 
argued that some women through participation in an armed group challenged the traditional 
gender roles and managed to benefit from the participation, most of the female fighters filled 
traditional roles and were subordinates in accordance with traditional gender roles (cf. chapter 
3.3). There is thus nothing signifying that the traditional views on women that were prevailing 
in Liberia weren’t also the attitudes of the male commanders, generals, and soldiers.  
Furthermore, in accordance with the UNIFEM (2004) “lessons learned”, Koliab (2010 
[interview]) argued that one of the reasons for women’s perspectives and needs not being 
taken into consideration, was that they did not hold high positions and leading roles in the 
armed groups. In dealing with the armed factions the DDR authorities talked to the male 
generals, which were at best indifferent to the inclusion of women, not reflecting on their 
different needs, but at worst opposed to it, deliberately deceiving the female fighters in their 
groups and depriving them the benefits of DDR participation. These attitudes manifested 
themselves when the warring parties agreed on and adopted the Comprehensive Peace 
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Agreement, which did not include gender mainstreamed policy prescription for the DDR 
programme. 
 
The National Transitional Government of Liberia was created through the comprehensive 
peace agreement, and mainly consisted of representatives from the three main factions in the 
war; GoL, LURD and MODEL, in addition to some individuals from business and civil 
society. The members with power in the NTGL were however the representatives from the 
former warring parties (Bøås 2009a:1334-1335, 2009b:8), bringing into the government the 
traditional attitudes towards women pointed to above. Looking at the gender distribution, the 
transitional government consisted mainly of male representatives. One of the ´lessons learned` 
from previous DDR processes is the importance of female participation in policy-making 
bodies for both the support for and commitment to gender mainstreaming (UNIFEM 2004:4). 
Women’s participation has value added as it is shown that women raise issues of relevance to 
women, and set other priorities for the post-conflict peace building (Bouta, Frerks and Hughes 
2005:16). The lack of female participation in the transitional government thereby underpins 
the perception of the NTGL as not particularly committed to gender mainstreaming the DDR 
process. 
 
An apparent group of supporters for the implementation of resolution 1325, article 13, was 
women’s NGOs, like the LWI, WIPNET and WONGOSOL. The women’s movement in 
Liberia was active, and as discussed in chapter 3, during the war they pressed for peace 
through for instance ´sit-down actions`. In Accra, during the negotiations on the Peace 
Agreement, they moreover lobbied strongly to make the CPA include a gender perspective 
(Danuweli 2010 [interview], Garlo 2010 [interview]). Through the so-called “Golden Tulip 
Declaration”, issued by representatives of women’s groups during the negotiations, they 
demanded amongst other things participation of women in the DDR programs, making 
references to resolution 1325 (Puechguirbal 2004:54). Even though their level of formal 
participation in the designing and implementation of the DDR is somewhat contested (see 
chapter 3.4), there is no doubt that they strongly supported the gender mainstreaming of the 
DDR process.  
 
When it comes to public opinion, understood as the aggregate of individual attitudes or beliefs 
held by the adult population, it is difficult to disclose any general response to the policy, as 
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the data on the issue is very scarce. Nonetheless, the traditional view on gender roles and a 
hesitation to regard women as fighters, implies a resistance towards implementing resolution 
1325, article 13. The problem of stigma when female fighters returned to their communities 
(see the discussion under chapter 4.3.3) supports this conclusion, indicating that they were a 
rather marginalised group. In accordance with this general impression Koliab (2010 
[interview]) and Muriithi (2010 [interview]) maintained that the traditional gender roles and 
socio cultural issues thoroughly founded in the Liberian society played a part, making it 
difficult to implement something “new” and challenging in terms of gender roles. Concluding, 
both the difficult circumstances on the ground, especially the time-problem, and the lack of 
substantial support from relevant groups, seem to have affected the performance of the 
implementation process negatively. 
5.2.6 The disposition of implementers  
The sixth variable, which all the other variables are affected by, is the disposition of the 
implementers. This signifies their perception of the policy, the direction of their response to it 
and the intensity of that response. The implementers are the ones who concretely express 
either a will or resistance to implementing a policy, so if there is a lack of political will and 
active commitment on the ground, the gender sensitive mandates in resolutions often do not 
translate into action (Antonini 2009:210). There are implementers on different levels, but my 
focus will be on the ´higher-level` bureaucrats. 
 
First of all, the implementers´ comprehension of the intent of the specific standards and 
objectives of the policy are relevant to their disposition. There is again reason to point to the 
substantially different responds my informants gave when assessing whether or not the 
implementation had been successful (cf. chapter 4.0). In my view some of these differences 
are caused by diverse perceptions on what the concept of gender mainstreaming means in 
reality and what the objectives of the implementation were. This can be caused both by 
conceptual incoherence and poor communication, but also different personal convictions.  
 
The direction of the responses to the resolution was obviously divided, as the individual 
actors working with the implementation were a diverse group, both nationals and 
internationals, representing a range of different organisations and interests. Raven-Roberts 
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(2005:44), however, claims that there is a bias against gender equality within the United 
Nations system, which is a function of the myriad of identities and associated “baggage” the 
staff bring to their jobs.  
 
Staff members represent a plethora of political, religious, social, and ethnic 
organizations and identify with many kinds of associations based on class, race, 
gender, professional, community, or kinship affiliations. This can bias 
interpretations of rules, regulations, and policies when staff struggles to reconcile 
their cultural values with the official cultural ethos of the United Nations (Raven-
Roberts 2005:54) 
 
The traditional views on gender roles that were prevailing in the Liberian society (see chapter 
3.3) were also seen in the UNMIL and other DDR authorities. In spite of a development when 
it comes to acknowledging that women occupy other roles then merely the “victim” role 
during wartime, there was a hesitation in implying that all women or girl combatants should 
be considered soldiers, a hesitation that does not exist with respect to male ex-combatants, 
even though some men and boys also fill support rather than combat roles (Jennings 
2009:482). It is startling to notice that in the official UNDDR (2006) statistics, all the women 
who took part in the DDR programme are referred to as WAFFs. Not one of the women is 
registered as a combatant. This stands in stark contrast to Pugel’s (2007:31) findings that as 
many as 71 per cent of the female ex-combatants reported their primary role in the armed 
forces to be a “combat soldiers” (versus 87 per cent of the male respondents), and Nicholas 
(2005:120) moreover, who claims that of the 33.241 women and children processed, 13.891 
brought weapons and ammunition with them.  
 
When the commitment to gender mainstreaming in general are low, the presence of strong 
advocates for the cause becomes more important. A challenge that has already been 
mentioned in relation to the process of designing the programme, and the lack of human 
resources, was the absence of a dedicated agency that could be responsible for female 
fighters. The UNIFEM did not come to Liberia until November 2004, a year after the 
launching of the programme, and were neither part of the Draft Interim Secretariat that 
defined the concrete standards and objectives in the program, nor extensively involved in the 
execution of the programme later on. Looking at the work done to address the different needs 
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of child combatants, UNICEF had a strong presence and was responsible for making a 
separate framework for child combatants in cooperation with the Liberian Ministry of 
Education, based on the Convention on Children’s Rights, education policies, and lessons 
learned from earlier DDR processes. Unlike the UNIFEM, they were represented in the Draft 
Interim Secretariat, and a “Child protection Network” comprising of 32 INGOs, plus national 
and local NGOs, took part in the process of designing the DDR guidelines (Clark 2010 
[interview]). Special information and “recruitment” strategies were moreover made to target 
child combatants. In their evaluation UNDP (2006:3) states that there was no pro-active 
network of partners working around the women’s issue or the reintegration in civil society as 
there were for children. Though not opposed to the implementation of the resolution, it does 
not seem to have prioritized by the UNIFEM. The commitment to facilitate a successful 
implementation of resolution 1325, article 13, was consequently absent in the specialized UN 
agency for women.   
 
In spite of all this Muriithi (2010 [interview]) maintained that the situation in Liberia was 
unique because there was a political will to integrate gender. The rather “liberal” step of 
lowering the admission criteria to the program (cf. chapter 4.2) expresses a will to include 
women in the program, and had positive consequences in terms of increasing the participation 
rate for women. The success of the change was however contested amongst some of my 
informants, and in an UNDP Activity Report (2004:47) the lowered admission criteria are 
criticised of being too “loose”, resulting in an admission of a high number of civilians. The 
problem with this was that such loose acceptance criteria leads to the waste of very limited 
financial resources (UNDP 2004:47). The DDR authorities thus seem to have had the choice 
between two evils, choosing to facilitate the inclusion of women. Pugel (2009:83, 96) argue 
that there was a general consensus in UNMIL that the DDR programmes should be accessible 
to the broadest possible population, and that it was UN senior staff that had recently 
participated in the DDR in Sierra Leone that recommended the change. Some of my 
informants on the other hand claimed that the change came from external pressure, especially 
from the women’s organisations that pressed the UNMIL to take into consideration the 
women who had occupied non-fighting roles in the armed forces. The timing of the change of 
policy, between the first problematic start of disarmament in early December 2003 and the 
resuming of the program in April 2004, makes it questionable whether this was an expression 
of a general political will within the UNMIL to include women, or simply a case of giving in 
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to pressure. Had there been a clear policy of female inclusion within the UNMIL, these 
policies would have been in place from the very beginning. The pressure might, as suggested, 
have come from external actors, but there is also reason to believe that the Office of the 
Gender Advisor had influence on the decision, as it was set up exactly around the time of the 
policy change, in December 2003.  
 
The impression I got in some of my interviews with UN staff, and which some of them 
expressed explicitly, was that they found my topic of research irrelevant, or that they were 
“tired of” being questioned about gender issues. The issue of gender mainstreaming the DDR 
process was apparently not regarded as particularly important. Since the main goal of the 
process was creating security (Bose 2010 [interview], Jennings 2009a and 2008, Koliab 2010 
[interview], Rasheed 2010 [interview]), and the female fighters in general were not regarded 
as a threat to peace, the whole issue of gender mainstreaming seems to have become 
secondary. Not only in the reintegration phase, as Jennings´ (2009a) points to, but also partly 
when it came to getting women to participate in the disarmament and demobilisation phase, as 
the broadening of admission criteria was not accompanied by practical strategies to reach the 
women.   
5.3 Three Expanded General Explanations 
To conclude on and summarize the findings, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) suggest three 
general explanations for unsuccessful implementation, which summarize their model and 
sheds light on the most relevant linkages between their independent and dependent variables. 
As my argument has been that the securitization hypothesis represents a necessary but not 
sufficient condition, an expanding of these explanations are required, assessing also the 
relation between the securitization variable and the other variables. 
 
The first general explanation for the gap between the prescribed policy and the action on the 
ground in Liberia was the poor communication in the implementation process. Even though 
the policy expressed in resolution 1325, article 13, is broad and general, the context-specific 
measures and objectives outlined in the Strategic and Implementation Framework (2003:64-
67) were both clear and consistent (cf. chapter 4.4). The problem was, however, that the 
specific measures were not in full compliance with the general resolutions. The important 
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component of getting women to participate was partly overlooked, with a lack of strategies to 
reach and “recruit” women to the program. Nevertheless, taking a starting point in the 
standards and objectives that were present, the findings point to a fragmented communication 
process within the mission and between the mission and other actors. The institutional 
structure and range of actors involved in the process greatly challenged the communication 
process, and the standards and objectives were not clearly and consistently communicated 
throughout the decision making body. In lack of a clear perception amongst many of the 
implementers of what the gender mainstreaming really signified, the immediately unclear 
“addressing the different needs” was partly sacrificed for the benefit of the clearer objective 
of getting a certain percentage of women to participate in the programmes. Paradoxically, this 
was the area in which the Strategy Framework did not specify any concrete measures, making 
it difficult to translate into action. It is thus clear that the poor communication process 
contributed to a gap between the prescribed policies and the action on the ground, as the 
standards and objectives of the specified policy was not clearly and consistently 
communicated to the implementers. 
 
The second explanation is that of capability problems. To successfully implement the gender 
mainstreaming, the UNMIL has to have the capacity to do what it is expected to do. This is 
related to having sufficient financial and human resources, the characteristics of the 
implementing agency, and the economic, social and political circumstances (Van Meter and 
Van Horn 1975:480). The financial problems in the DDR process were apparent, and though 
it had consequences for all the beneficiaries in the program, the findings indicated that the 
consequences were worst for the female ex-combatants. There was moreover a lack of human 
resources dedicated to the implementation of the resolution, and the technical capability 
throughout the mission was scarce and inadequate, making gender mainstreaming at all levels 
challenging. The absence of a dedicated UN agency with particular capacity and 
responsibility for women were especially decisive for the poor implementation. In the 
designing phase of the programme this lead to a lack of much-needed analysis of the specific 
situation of female ex-combatants, as there was no staff with the technical capacity on gender. 
I argue that this contributed to the failure to fully comprehend the range of the general 
resolutions and deciphering the “different needs” of female fighters, in addition to the failure 
to create specific measures to get women to participate in the program. The high number of 
actors and the unclear hierarchical strategies moreover lead to a fragmentation of 
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responsibility, as everyone were supposed to include gender strategies but no-one had the 
absolute responsibility. This made having a dedicated agency taking the over all responsibility 
even more important. 
 
The challenging circumstances apparently reinforced the problems with limited human 
resources and capacity. Specifically the “state-of-emergency” argument, in which the gender 
perspective is sacrificed because there is no time to consider it, affects the capability. 
Interestingly, it seems like this was not a prevailing problem when it came to making a 
separate framework for the child combatants. UNICEF was extensively involved in the DDR 
process, unlike UNIFEM, and made both separate recruitment strategies and programme 
designs. This indicates that the deficiency to gender mainstream the framework was more a 
result of lacking political will, a dedicated agency taking responsibility for women, and 
shortage of resources, rather then a result of the difficult circumstances.   
 
The third explanation regards the disposition of the implementers, and implicitly involves all 
the other independent variables in the model. Both the communication of the policy, training 
and follow-up can affect the dispositions of the implementers (Van Meter and Van Horn 
1975:475), by increasing their understanding of the importance of implementing the policy in 
question. Analysing the disposition of the implementers, there were no unambiguous findings 
pointing to a resistance against including women amongst the implementers, the problem was 
rather that the issue was seen as unimportant. The inadequate training and unclear 
communication process in Liberia lead to a lack of understanding of what the gender 
mainstreaming in reality was, and why the inclusion of women was important, something that 
seems to have resulted in an indifference to the whole question. The type and extent of 
resources made available can also affect the disposition of the implementers, as vast funding 
or human resources can make the implementers view the program with added favour. The 
opposite was the case in Liberia, with both a funding shortage and scarce human resources, 
indicating that the policy was not particularly important. The circumstances on the ground are 
of importance. Implementers` desire to minimize public hostility or their ideologically based 
inclination to be responsive to public wishes may influence their behavior, even though it may 
be inconsistent with their own preferences (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975:477). In general, 
traditional gender roles were prevailing, and some of the most important national interest 
groups were rather indifferent to the policy, making it challenging to implement.  
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UNIFEM (2004:9) claims, as pointed to in the introduction, that the need to integrate gender 
perspectives to precipitate the degree of social change and transformation required to 
demilitarize a violent society, an instrumentalist line of argumentation, is increasingly being 
recognised. At the higher level in the UN, seen in resolution 1325, an inclusion of women in 
DDR is advocated from both a normative and an instrumentalist view. However, on the lower 
level in Liberia, none of these approaches seems to have been prevailing. There rather seems 
to have been an attitude that gender was only another issue to be checked of the list, and the 
implementers considered ´gender issues` simply because they were supposed to.  
 
The necessary and underlying condition of the process being security- driven and justified had 
linkages to some of the variables in Van Meter and Van Horn´s model, both affecting them 
and being affected by them. My argument for the need to include other variables was that 
there is no inherent contradiction in security being the main priority and successfully 
implementing resolution 1325, article 13. However, as the human and financial resources 
were scarce in the Liberian DDR programme, and one did not have the capacity to address all 
the different goals of the DDR, the consequences of prioritizing security equals a disregarding 
of gender issues, strengthening the explanatory power of Jennings´ argument. Moreover, as 
security is seen as the most important, the commitment to gender mainstreaming in general 
becomes smaller.  
5.4 Summary  
My findings supported the main component of Jennings´ securitization argument, that the 
main goal of the DDR process was security. An extended explanation was given through the 
implementation framework, in which the most important explanations for the gap between the 
prescribed policies and action on the ground were a lack of resources and technical capacity 
on gender, poor communication, weak enforcement mechanisms, and the absence of a 
dedicated agency with responsibility for the female ex-combatants. The securitization-
argument in some instances reinforced the problems created by structural, procedural and 
capacity problems.  
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6 Summing up   
Women are not only victims, or survivors of war. They are also actors, sometimes participants 
in conflicts, and have different needs in the DDR process. DDR processes have become a 
crucial part of all peacekeeping operations, offering an opportunity for combatants to become 
civilians, and contributing in the transforming of war-torn communities. To leave women and 
girls behind in such a crucial moment is not only to violate their right to participate but also 
to undermine the very objectives of DDR, namely sustainable and equitable development 
(UNIFEM 2004:1) 
 
This thesis has aimed to explain the reasons for the gap between the prescribed DDR policies 
of gender mainstreaming and the action on the ground in Liberia. The DDR process that was 
launched after 14 years of devastating civil war in 2003, intended to include and address the 
different needs of a high number of women who had participated in the conflict. The intent 
was however not adequately translated into action, as there was a lower participation rate and 
a higher drop-out rate amongst the female ex-combatants, and in a number of instances the 
DDR authorities failed to address the different needs of women. The research question was 
approached through a case study, in which semi-structured interviews with key-actors was the 
main method of data gathering. In opposition to previous research, the focus have not been 
only on the explanations based in a feminist-security paradigm, in which traditional gender 
roles and security perceptions are seen as the reason for this gap. Rather relevant variables of 
a structural, institutional and personal characteristics have been included in the explanation 
through the analytical framework of implementation theory. The assumption of Jennings´ so 
called securitization argument however, was treated as an underlying variable. 
 
The main findings in the thesis can be grouped in accordance with Van Meter and Van Horn´s 
(1975) three general explanations on the performance of an implementation process, namely 
the ´communications process`, the ´capability problem`, and the ´disposition of the 
implementers`. First of all, the institutional structure of the peacekeeping mission, with a 
range of different actors, made the inter- and intra organisational communication more 
difficult. This resulted in an inadequate communicating of the standards and objectives of 
gender mainstreaming to the staff. Lacking a thorough understanding of the policy, the 
program thus became more about getting a certain percentage of female ex-combatants in the 
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programmes, then actually addressing their different needs. Secondly, the gap was caused by 
a lack of human and financial resources dedicated to the implementing of the gender 
mainstreaming. Combined with a lack of technical capacity on gender throughout the mission, 
this created capability problems. Moreover, the absence of UNIFEM in the process was 
decisive, as the institutional structure created a fragmentation of the responsibility on gender. 
There was therefore a need of a dedicated agency to monitor, advise and follow-up on the 
implementing process, to make sure that the needs of women were being catered for. Because 
of this lack of financial and human resources, the DDR-authorities were moreover forced to 
make priorities on the goals of the process. Security was the prioritized goal in the process, 
and as women based on traditional gender views were not seen as a threat to security to the 
same extent as men, they were disregarded. Thirdly, the commitment to gender 
mainstreaming amongst the implementers was rather low. There were no clear indications of 
negative responses to the policy, but rather an indifferent attitude, contributing to the policies 
not being adequately implemented. 
 
The findings show that there are some inherent challenges in implementing resolutions 
through peacekeeping operations, as the actors are numerous, resources scarce, and 
circumstances in which the policies are implemented, unstable. Implementing policies of 
gender mainstreaming through these missions are even more challenging, as there is a lack of 
conceptual coherence in the field, lack of staff with capacity on gender, and a general bias 
against gender equality.  
 
One of the challenges of using the implementation theory framework has been its 
comprehensiveness, demanding a lot of data. There has thus been a lack of sufficient reliable 
data when it came to considering “values” on some of the independent variables in the 
analytical framework. Not being able to measure all of the variables in detail, both because of 
lacking data, but also because of the wide scope of it, some general considerations have been 
performed instead. To perform a thorough analysis, illuminating all the different aspects of 
the implementation process, a much broader gathering of data would be necessary. My intent 
was however not to map the implementation process, but rather point to some of the more 
general challenges, and for that purpose the framework have been appropriate.  
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This analysis should not be seen as a thorough test of the theoretical arguments presented, 
they are rather used in a pragmatic manner, focusing on shedding light on the Liberian case. 
My thesis can contribute by providing new theoretical insights, having used a different 
approach then is usual, and applied the implementation theory to the international level.  
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Appendix I – List of Interviews 
 
United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL): 
 
 
RRR-Section: 
Koliab, Nahataba  
DDR Officer- Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Recovery, Civil Affairs Section – United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).  
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 15.03.10 
 
Associate DDR Officer- Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Recovery, Civil Affairs Section – 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 15.03.10 
 
 
Office of the Gender Advisor: 
Muriithi, James Mugo  
Gender Affairs Officer – United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 11.03.10. 
 
 
National Commission to the DDRR (NCDDRR) 
Randall, Lawrence  
Former Senior Communication Officer, NCDDRR (April 2004 – February 2005). Now works 
as Executive Director of Liberia Media Center. 
Personal interview in Monrovia, 19.03.10 
 
Former agent, NCDDR (2003).  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 08.03.10 
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UNICEF 
Clark, Miatta A.  
Child Protection Officer at UNICEF.  
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 08.03.10 
 
UNIFEM 
Lincoln, Allen  
Programme Assistant – UNIFEM 
Came to UNIFEM in August 2005.  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 11.03.10 
 
UNDP 
Aibinu, Aderemi  
DDR technical advisor, UNDP.  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 19.03.10. 
 
Bose, Shipra  
Senior Gender Advisor UNDP – Liberia. 
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10 
 
Rasheed, Farzana 
Former Reporting Officer, UNDP (April 2004 – August 2008).  
Personal Interview in Monrovia, 02.03.10. 
 
Former staff member, UNDP  
Personal interviews in Monrovia, 24.02.10 and 26.02.10 
 
 
Gender Ministry 
Representative from the UN Government Joint Program on SGBV.  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 15.03.1 
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WIPNET/WONGOSOL 
Danuweli, Cecilia  
Programme officer – WIPNET 
Personal interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10 
 
Officer assistant – WIPNET  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10 
 
Garlo, Cerue  
Co-funder of WIPNET, worked there from 2002-2005.  
Executive director of WONGOSOL from 2005-2009.  
Personal interview in Monrovia, 18.03.10. 
 
Non Governmental Organisations: 
 
Landmine Action 
Goll, Boima  
Project manager, Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme, a reintegration project for ex-
combatants.  
Personal interview in Salala, Bong County, 10.03.10  
 
Hopkins, Will 
Programme Officer, Landmine Action Liberia 
Personal interview in Monrovia, 01.03.10 
 
Psychosocial counsellors at the ”Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme”, a reintegration 
project for ex-combatants.  
Group interview in Salala, Bong County, 10.03.10 
 
International Committee for the Red Cross: 
Psychosocial counsellor at the ”Women’s integration project” – a training programme for 
vulnerable women.  
Personal interview in Central New Cru Town, Monrovia, 11.03. 
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Female ex-combatants: 
 
Participants in the “Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme”, a Landmine Action 
reintegration project for ex-combatants.  
Personal interviews conducted with translator (psychosocial counsellor in the program) in 
Salala, Bong County, 10.03.10.  
 
1-  “Benita”   38 years old 
2- “Dekontee”   28 years old 
3-  “Josefine”   28 years old 
4- “Marie”   25 years old 
5-  “Marthaline” 21 years old 
6-  “Mona”   27 years old 
7-  “Pandora”   19 years old 
8-  “Princess”   30 years old  
9-  “Rita “  25 years old 
10-   “Rose”  19 years old 
11-  “Roseline”   26 years old  
12- ”Victoria”  27 years old 
 
 
Participants in the Red Cross Women’s integration project, a training programme for 
vulnerable women. Group interview conducted with translator (psychosocial counsellor in the 
program) in New Kru Town, Monrovia, 17.03.10.  
1- “Bendu” 
2- “Ellen” 
3- “Elletha” 
4- “Florence” 
5- “Lorpu” 
6- “Musu” 
7- “Victoria” 
 
 
